Charting a Course for Federal Removal through the Abstention Doctrine: A Titanic Experience in the Sargasso Sea of Jurisdictional Manipulation by Plitt, Steven & Rogers, Joshua D.
DePaul Law Review 
Volume 56 
Issue 1 Fall 2006 Article 4 
Charting a Course for Federal Removal through the Abstention 
Doctrine: A Titanic Experience in the Sargasso Sea of 
Jurisdictional Manipulation 
Steven Plitt 
Joshua D. Rogers 
Follow this and additional works at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/law-review 
Recommended Citation 
Steven Plitt & Joshua D. Rogers, Charting a Course for Federal Removal through the Abstention Doctrine: 
A Titanic Experience in the Sargasso Sea of Jurisdictional Manipulation , 56 DePaul L. Rev. 107 (2006) 
Available at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/law-review/vol56/iss1/4 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Law at Via Sapientiae. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in DePaul Law Review by an authorized editor of Via Sapientiae. For more information, 
please contact digitalservices@depaul.edu. 
CHARTING A COURSE FOR FEDERAL REMOVAL
THROUGH THE ABSTENTION DOCTRINE:
A TITANIC EXPERIENCE IN THE SARGASSO SEA
OF JURISDICTIONAL MANIPULATION
Steven Plitt and Joshua D. Rogers*
Do not go where the path may lead,
go instead where there is no path and leave a trail.
- Ralph Waldo Emerson
INTRODUCTION
It is well known within the legal community that plaintiffs prefer to
argue their cases in state court. This preference is more than whimsi-
cal fancy. Litigation in federal court is perceived as "more expensive
and time consuming."1 Plaintiffs are also rightfully concerned that
federal judges with overburdened dockets 2 will look for ways to
quickly unload their cases. Federal judges have increasingly disposed
of cases by exercising stringent control of discovery, aggressively en-
couraging settlement, and granting summary judgment more
frequently.3
Plaintiffs' fear of federal court is borne out by statistics. Two Cor-
nell law professors authored a study in 1998, which concluded that the
plaintiff "win rate" in removed federal civil cases was 36.77%, com-
* Steven Plitt is a former adjunct professor of law at Arizona State University where he
taught insurance law courses. He is a senior shareholder and chairperson of the multi-state
coverage practice group in the Phoenix law firm of Kunz Plitt Hyland Demlong & Kleifield. Mr.
Plitt has advised clients regarding coverage and bad faith issues in thirty-five states. He has been
an expert witness in insurance coverage and bad faith cases in five states. Mr. Plitt is the author
selected by Thompson-West Publishing to revise COUCH ON INSURANCE 3d. Joshua D. Rogers is
an associate with the law firm of Kunz Plitt Hyland Demlong & Kleifield. He graduated from
Pepperdine Law School, cum laude, in 2001. Mr. Rogers focuses his practice upon the litigation
of complex insurance coverage cases. Mr. Rogers is an associate author of COUCH ON INSUR-
ANCE 3d.
1. See Gregory M. Cesarano & Daniel R. Vega, So You Thought a Remand Was Imminent?
Post-Removal Litigation & the Waiver of the Right to Seek a Remand Grounded on Removal
Defects, 74 FLA. B.J. 22, 23-24 (2000).
2. See Abner J. Mikva, It's Time to "Unfix" the Criminal Justice System, 20 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 825, 829 (1993) (arguing the so-called war on drugs has so overburdened the federal judici-
ary that getting a civil case tried in federal court is almost impossible).
3. Jonathan T. Molot, An Old Judicial Role for a New Litigation Era, 113 YALE L.J. 27, 39-41
(2003).
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pared to an overall win rate in federal civil cases of 57.97%.4 The
statistics in diversity cases were even more startling. The win rate in
original diversity cases was 71%, compared to a 34% win rate in re-
moved cases. 5 This disparity may also be the result of forum impact,
since "[r]emoved plaintiffs fare relatively worse before judges than
before juries."' 6 Plaintiffs are thus confronted with problematic op-
tions in federal court. On the one hand, they face federal judges who
may be more ambivalent toward plaintiffs because they are insulated
from local election pressures.7 On the other hand, they face the una-
nimity requirement of jury trials,8 which leaves them little room for
error.
Enterprising plaintiffs' attorneys have developed numerous strate-
gies for defeating the removal of their lawsuits to federal court.9 A
new method for defeating removal is developing in the context of the
Federal Declaratory Judgment Act (FDJA) 1° and involves the broad
use of the abstention doctrine. Some circuit courts have expanded the
application of the Brillhart v. Excess Insurance Co. of America" ab-
stention doctrine to defeat removal in declaratory judgment actions
where no procedural. defect existed in a removal based on diversity. 12
These decisions have broad implications beyond the FDJA and may
result in courts employing this abstention power in all cases being re-
moved from state to federal court.
The constitutional purpose of diversity jurisdiction is to protect out-
of-state defendants from possible local or state bias by judges and ju-
ries. Procedural manipulation interferes with defendants' right to fed-
eral jurisdiction for claims of large value between citizens of different
states. Moreover, interference with diversity jurisdiction gives rise to
concerns about whether state judges will actually enforce the interests
of the public at large for a claim or class action affecting nationwide
interests. Manipulation of procedural rules to affect jurisdiction often
gives rise to criticism focused on the plaintiffs' bar. However, manipu-
4. Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Do Case Outcomes Really Reveal Anything
About the Legal System? Win Rates and Removal Jurisdiction, 83 CORNELL L. REv. 581, 593
(1998).
5. Id.
6. Id. at 601.
7. Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1120-21 (1977) (arguing that
elected state judges are more affected by majoritarian pressure than life-tenured federal judges).
8. FED. R. Civ. P. 48.
9. See infra Part ll.B.
10. 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (2000).
11. See 316 U.S. 491 (1942).
12. See infra Part III.
[Vol. 56:107
2006] MISUSE OF THE ABSTENTION DOCTRINE 109
lation of the abstention doctrine requires direct judicial involvement
by the federal bench and presents a serious challenge to federalism.
Part II of this Article discusses the most commonly used and well-
recognized procedural strategies to defeat removal.' 3 Part II.A gives
a general explanation of removal and highlights the various procedu-
ral mechanisms available to defeat removal. 14 Part II.B discusses the
specific procedural requirements that attorneys have manipulated in
their quest to avoid federal court.15
Part III of this Article discusses the manner in which some federal
courts are utilizing the abstention doctrine to defeat removal. 16 Part
III.A reviews the abstention doctrine and its variants including the
Railroad Commission of Texas v. Pullman Co.,17 Burford v. Sun Oil
Co.,18 Younger v. Harris,19 and Brillhart variants.20 In Part III.B, the
Article discusses how the courts have expanded Brillhart abstention to
prevent effective removal.2 t
II. PROCEDURAL CHALLENGES TO REMOVAL
A. Understanding Removal
The original Judiciary Act of 1789 provided for removal of cases
from state to federal court in limited situations.22 Removal of cases to
13. See infra notes 22-208 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 22-54 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 55-208 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 209-323 and accompanying text.
17. 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
18. 319 U.S. 315 (1943).
19. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
20. See infra notes 220-314 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 315-323 and accompanying text.
22. 14B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 3721 (3d ed. 1998). Removal had limited application in the early
nineteenth century as a result of the landmark Supreme Court decision of Strawbridge v. Curtiss,
7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806). The Court in Strawbridge held that the Judiciary Act of 1789
required complete diversity of citizenship between the parties as a prerequisite to federal diver-
sity jurisdiction. Id. at 267-68. In 1866, Congress enacted the Separable Controversy Act, which
allowed an out-of-state defendant to remove part of a case filed in state court provided that the
removed part was "separable" from the rest of the suit and diversity existed between the parties
to the "separable" case. Ch. 288, 14 Stat. 306 (1866).
The Supreme Court established the test for determining whether a separate independent claim
existed within a lawsuit in American Fire & Casualty Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6 (1951). The Court
explained that "where there is a simple wrong to plaintiff, for which relief is sought, arising from
an interlocked series of transactions, there is no separate and independent claim or cause of
action under § 1441(c)." Id. at 14. See generally Edward Hartnett, A New Trick from an Old and
Abused Dog: Section 1441(c) Lives and Now Permits the Remand of Federal Question Cases, 63
FORDHAM L. REV. 1099 (1995) (providing historical analysis of § 1441(c)). A separate and inde-
pendent claim is one that stands on its own facts and does not rely on other claims within the
lawsuit to justify the application of supplemental jurisdiction. See Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v.
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federal court must be predicated on either subject-matter jurisdiction
or diversity jurisdiction. 23 The bulk of disputes regarding removal,
therefore, involve jurisdictional issues.24
The federal removal statutes are strictly construed; all doubts re-
garding removability are resolved in favor of a remand to state
court. 25 The burden of establishing removal jurisdiction rests with the
party seeking removal, and the burden includes both establishing fed-
eral jurisdiction and showing that the appropriate removal procedures
have been followed. 26
Federal question jurisdiction exists over "all civil actions arising
under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. '27 A
case is deemed to "arise under" federal law when federal law either
explicitly2 8 or implicitly2 9 "creates the cause of action" upon which the
plaintiff is suing.30 The suit must "really and substantially involve[ ] a
dispute or controversy respecting the validity, construction or effect of
such a law, upon the determination of which the result depends. '31
The "well-pleaded complaint rule" requires the federal question to
appear on the face of the complaint. 32 Under this rule, only federal
claims-not federal defenses-permit federal court review.33  Re-
Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 355 n.l (1998) (providing an analysis of supplemental jurisdiction). Com-
pare Richard D. Freer, Compounding Confusion and Hampering Diversity: Life After Finley and
the Supplemental Jurisdiction Statute, 40 EMORY L.J. 445 (1991) (criticizing the supplemental
jurisdiction statute), with Thomas D. Rowe, Jr. et al., Compounding or Creating Confusion
About Supplemental Jurisdiction? A Reply to Professor Freer, 40 EMORY L.J. 943 (1991) (sup-
porting the supplemental jurisdiction statute). Where the claim involves "substantially the same
facts" as other claims in the lawsuit, it is not separate and independent under § 1441(c). See, e.g.,
Eastus v. Blue Bell Creameries, L.P., 97 F.3d 100, 104 (5th Cir. 1996). Thus, "if one claim de-
pends on establishing liability under the other, the two cannot be found to be independent." Id.;
see also Moore v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 819 F.2d 101, 104 (5th Cir. 1987).
23. Removal of cases to federal court is governed by 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441-1452 (2000).
24. Gordon D. Polozola, Note, The Battle of Removal-Is Delay the Ultimate Weapon?: A
Note on Martine v. National Tea Company, 54 LA. L. REV. 1419, 1423 (1994).
25. Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 108-09 (1941).
26. Allen v. R&H Oil & Gas Co., 63 F.3d 1326, 1335 (5th Cir. 1995).
27. 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
28. See Feibelman v. Packard, 109 U.S. 421, 424 (1883).
29. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 396
(1971).
30. Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust for S. Cal., 463 U.S. 1, 8-9
(1983) (quoting Am. Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257, 260 (1916)).
31. Shulthis v. McDougal, 225 U.S. 561, 569 (1912); see also Gully v. First Nat'l Bank in Me-
ridian, 299 U.S. 109, 112 (1936) (stating that federal question jurisdiction requires that the fed-
eral issue "be an element, and an essential one, of the plaintiff's cause of action").
32. See Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152 (1908) (describing the well-
pleaded complaint rule).
33. The "well-pleaded complaint rule" has been criticized. See, e.g., CHARLES ALAN WRICHT,.
LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 18 (5th ed. 1994) ("If the basis for original federal-question juris-
diction is that the federal courts have a special expertness in applying federal law ... it would
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moval of a claim based on the presence of a federal question requires
that the claim at issue in the state proceeding arise under the laws of
the Constitution of the United States.3 4 The presence of a federal de-
fense or counterclaim is an insufficient basis for removing a case to
federal court on federal question grounds.35
Diversity jurisdiction exists over controversies between citizens of
different states, or between a state and its citizens and a foreign state
and its citizens, where the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000, ex-
clusive of interest and costs. 36 Once a case is removed, "the federal
court acquires full and exclusive subject-matter jurisdiction over the
litigation. ' 37 Although state law will still apply after removal, the fed-
eral court is not "bound by any rule of state practice that conflicts with
one of the federal rules."'38 State court interlocutory rulings are not
binding upon a federal court,39 but litigants must abide by those rul-
ings until they are vacated by a federal court. 40
Any act demonstrating "unequivocal assent" to federal jurisdiction
waives a plaintiff's right to seek remand. 41 Due to the fact that a trial
judge has broad discretion in determining whether defects in the re-
moval process have been waived, 42 courts have taken varying views on
the question of what constitutes waiver. Some courts have concluded
that the filing of an amended complaint or the serving of discovery
seem that the courts should have jurisdiction where there is some federal issue regardless of
which pleading raises it."). See generally Donald L. Doernberg, There's No Reason for It; It's
Just Our Policy: Why the Well-Pleaded Complaint Rule Sabotages the Purposes of Federal Ques-
tion Jurisdiction, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 597 (1987) (explaining why the rule ought to be abandoned).
34. 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (2000).
35. See, e.g., Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 829-31
(2002) (holding that federal question jurisdiction exists only when a federal question appears on
the face of the plaintiff's properly pleaded complaint).
36. 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
37. Tehan v. Disability Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 111 F. Supp. 2d 542, 547 (D.N.J. 2000).
38. Redfield v. Cont'l Cas. Corp., 818 F.2d 596, 605 (7th Cir. 1987).
39. Daniels v. McKay Mach. Co., 607 F.2d 771. 773-74 (7th Cir. 1979) (holding that a state
court's denial of summary judgment was an interlocutory order and was not the law of the case,
thus permitting the federal court to reconsider the denial following removal).
40. 14C CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3738 (3d ed. 1998).
41. See, e.g., Courville v. Texaco, Inc., 741 F. Supp. 108, 111 (E.D. La. 1990) (holding that a
plaintiff's affirmative conduct and acquiescence to a federal forum in an identical action involv-
ing the same parties constituted unequivocal assent to federal jurisdiction, thereby waiving any
right to seek remand); Reed v. Chesney, 709 F. Supp. 792, 794 n.3 (E.D. Mich. 1989) ("A party
may waive objections to procedural defects when there is 'affirmative conduct or unequivocal
assent of a sort which would render it offensive to fundamental principles of fairness to re-
mand."' (quoting Feller v. Nat'l Enquirer, 555 F. Supp. 1114, 1121 (N.D. Ohio 1983))).
42. Godman v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 588 F. Supp. 121, 124 n.3 (E.D. Mich. 1984).
2006]
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requests can be deemed a waiver.43 Other courts have taken a more
limited view of waiver, holding that an act by a plaintiff can be consid-
ered "unequivocal assent" only if that act was initiated by the plaintiff.
Pursuant to this reasoning, for example, it has been held that a plain-
tiff's filing of a responsive brief to a motion for summary judgment did
not constitute waiver because the brief was filed in response to a mat-
ter initiated by the defendant. 44
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction45 and, therefore,
any case which is removed must be one which, at the time of removal,
could have been brought initially in federal court.46 There has been a
"torrent of litigation" involving disputes over subject-matter jurisdic-
tion that has threatened to overwhelm the federal judicial system.47
In response, Congress enacted the comprehensive Judicial Improve-
ments Act of 1988.48 The Act expanded the court's authority to sanc-
tion defendants who improperly remove their cases to federal court.49
Once a case is removed under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), only "a defect in
removal procedure or a lack of subject matter jurisdiction" will sup-
port a remand.50 Removal defects based on a lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction can be raised at any time, but if the removal defect is pro-
43. See Donahue v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 194 F.2d 6, 10 (10th Cir. 1952); Maybruck v.
Haim, 290 F. Supp. 721, 723-24 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Chevrier v. Metro. Opera Ass'n, 113 F. Supp.
109, 110 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
44. See Feller, 555 F. Supp. at 1121; Kramer v. Jarvis, 81 F. Supp. 360, 361-62 (D. Neb. 1948).
45. Coury v. Prot, 85 F.3d 244, 248 (5th Cir. 1996).
46. See, e.g., Cervantez v. Bexar County Civil Serv. Comm'n, 99 F.3d 730, 733 (5th Cir. 1996).
A defendant's removal of a case to federal court is subject to two general remand statutes. See
28 U.S.C. §§ 1441(c), 1447(c) (2000). Both the plaintiff and the court may question the propriety
of the removal under these statutes. See generally Mark Herrmann, Thermtron Revisited: When
and How Federal Trial Court Remand Orders Are Reviewable, 19 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 395 (1987).
47. H.R. REP. No. 100-889, at 23 (1988), as reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5982, 5983-84.
Approximately 15% of the 18,860 cases removed to federal court each year are eventually re-
manded. Neal Miller, An Empirical Study of Forum Choices in Removal Cases Under Diversity
and Federal Question Jurisdiction, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 369, 392 (1992); see also Christopher R.
McFadden, Removal, Remand, and Reimbursement Under 28 U.S. C. § 1447(c), 87 MARO. L.
REV. 123, 124 (2003).
48. Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act of 1988, Pub. L. 100-702, 102 Stat. 4642
(1988) (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
49. See, e.g., Morris v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 985 F.2d 238, 240 (6th Cir. 1993); Grace v.
Interstate Life & Accident, Ins. Co., 916 F. Supp. 1185, 1191-92 (M.D. Ala. 1996); M.D.C.
Wallcoverings v. State Bank of Woodstock, 771 F. Supp. 242, 244 (N.D. Ill. 1991). Under 28
U.S.C. § 1447(c), the court is empowered to shift fees when it determines it lacks jurisdiction
over a case. See, e.g., Tenner v. Zurek, 168 F.3d 328, 330 (7th Cit. 1999). Before the amendment,
such an award was forbidden unless the defendant acted in bad faith. See, e.g., Moore v.
Permanente Med. Group, Inc., 981 F.2d 443, 446 (9th Cir. 1992); Bucary v. Rothrock, 883 F.2d
447, 449 (6th Cir. 1989); Cornwall v. Robinson, 654 F.2d 685, 687 (10th Cir. 1981).
50. Jamison v. Wiley, 14 F.3d 222, 239 (4th Cir. 1994); accord Thermtron Prods., Inc. v.
Hermansdorfer, 423 U.S. 336, 345 (1976) ("The District Court exceeded its authority in remand-
ing on grounds not permitted by [28 U.S.C. § 1447(c)].").
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cedural, a plaintiff has thirty days to file a notice of remand or the
procedural defect is waived.51
There is a split of authority over whether a district court can re-
mand sua sponte on the basis of a procedural defect.5 2 On one hand, a
court has no discretion to avoid a remand where a procedural or juris-
dictional defect has been asserted. 53 On the other hand, where "juris-
diction exists and was properly invoked, the Court has no discretion to
remand."54
B. Procedural Attempts to Defeat Federal Jurisdiction
Plaintiffs can manipulate procedural rules to create obstacles to the
removal of a state-based proceeding. These procedural obstacles in-
clude (1) eliminating federal claims or disguising federal claims as
state claims;55 (2) delaying service on defendants and manipulating
the unanimous consent rule;5 6 (3) suing nondiverse defendants;57 (4)
manipulating the amount in controversy; 58 (5) using the nonaggrega-
tion rule in class actions;59  and (6) manipulating the time
requirements. 60
1. Avoiding or Disguising Federal Claims
Federal courts will not read federal claims into a complaint that al-
leges only state law claims-provided state law affords a remedy. 61
51. Maniar v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 979 F.2d 782, 783 (9th Cir. 1992); Fed. Deposit Ins.
Corp. v. Loyd, 955 F.2d 316, 321 (5th Cir. 1992).
52. Compare Page v. City of Southfield, 45 F.3d 128, 129 (6th Cir. 1995), with In re Cont'l Cas.
Co., 29 F.3d 292, 294 (7th Cir. 1994).
53. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (2000). However, a few courts have created a practical exception
to this rule, allowing the removing party thirty days to correct a procedural defect after removal.
See O'Halloran v. Univ. of Wash., 856 F.2d 1375, 1381 (9th Cir. 1988); Loftin v. Rush, 767 F.2d
800, 805 (11th Cir. 1985); Fristoe v. Reynolds Metals Co., 615 F.2d 1209, 1212 (9th Cir. 1980);
Computer People, Inc. v. Computer Dimensions Int'l, Inc., 638 F. Supp. 1293, 1296-97 (M.D. La.
1986).
54. Burnette v. Godshall, 828 F. Supp. 1439, 1444 (N.D. Cal. 1993), affd sub nom. Burnette v.
Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., 72 F.3d 766 (9th Cir. 1995); see also Davis v. Joyner, 240 F.
Supp. 689, 690 (E.D.N.C. 1964) ("[Wlhere Congress has provided both a state and a federal
forum, and has further provided for actions first brought in the state court to be removed to the
federal court, no discretionary power exists to remand the case to the state court." (citing Vann
v. Jackson, 165 F. Supp. 377, 381 (E.D.N.C. 1958))).
55. See infra Part I1B..1.
56. See infra Part II.B.2.
57. See infra Part II.B.3.
58. See infra Part II.B.4.
59. See infra Part II.B.5.
60. See infra Part II.B.6.
61. See Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 & n.7 (1987). The mere fact that a
complaint refers to a federal statute does not mean that the claim arises under federal law.
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Even if a claim may also be brought under a federal statute, federal
courts will not disrupt the plaintiff's choice of law if state law provides
relief.62 Federal courts will not go beyond the pleadings to ascertain
what the plaintiff could or should have pleaded.63
There exists a well-entrenched judicial belief that a plaintiff has a
superior right to the selection of a forum.64 This supposed "right" has
little jurisprudential basis. No such right is expressed in the Constitu-
tion, because the Constitution draws no distinction between plaintiffs
and defendants. The Constitution creates categories of potential fed-
eral jurisdiction and reserves for Congress the general authority to
implement that jurisdiction. 65 The Constitution "was designed for the
common and equal benefit of all the people of the United States. '66
The judicial belief that the plaintiff possesses a superior right to select
the forum creates significant tension between a constitutional system
that envisions equal access to federal courts and a judicial presump-
tion that provides greater access to one class of citizens at the expense
of another.
Presumptions against removal have created a system in which pro-
cedural gamesmanship is rewarded. Justice Scalia has criticized judi-
cial presumptions because they necessarily import judicial bias into
the simple act of construing language; he has observed that "[a] text
should not be construed strictly, and it should not be construed leni-
Federal question jurisdiction exists only if federal law creates the cause of action or is an essen-
tial element of the claim. See Merrell Dow Pharms. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 817 (1986).
Where federal law simply creates a standard of care or conduct that is but one element of the
cause of action based on state law, no federal jurisdiction exists. See, e.g., Howery v. Allstate Ins.
Co., 243 F.3d 912, 915 (5th Cir. 2001). In Howery, the plaintiff alleged bad faith including viola-
tions of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act. Id. Three years after filing the original peti-
tion, the complaint was amended to allege that one of the deceptive trade practices violated the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) rules, regulations, and statutes. Id. Upon amendment, All-
state removed and the plaintiff's motion for remand was denied. Id. The Fifth Circuit reversed,
finding that reference to the FTC rule violations was insufficient to establish federal jurisdiction
because the alleged violations were only a subset of a state cause of action and not essential to
the claim. Id. at 921.
62. See, e.g., Willy v. Coastal Corp., 855 F.2d 1160, 1167 (5th Cir. 1988).
63. See 16 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE § 107.14[3](a)[iii] (3d ed.
2006).
64. Auchinleck v. Town of LaGrange, 167 F. Supp. 2d 1066, 1069 (E.D. Wis. 2001) (citing
Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 104-07 (1941)).
65. See U.S. CONST. art. 3, § 2. See generally Robert N. Clinton, A Mandatory View of Federal
Court Jurisdiction: Early Implementation of and Departures from the Constitutional Plan, 86
COLUM. L. REV. 1515 (1986); Charles Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary
Act of 1789, 37 HARV L. REV. 49 (1923) (providing a history of the Judicial Act of 1789).
66. Martin v. Hunter, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 348 (1816).
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ently; it should be construed reasonably, to contain all that it fairly
means."
67
The defendant has the burden of proving that a case, although dis-
guised as a state law claim, actually requires a determination of fed-
eral law.68 A plaintiff can make this task nearly impossible by
disclaiming a federal cause of action in the complaint. Courts fre-
quently cite such disclaimers as evidence that a complaint does not
invoke federal question jurisdiction. 69 But even if the court finds that
the complaint implicates a federal question, a plaintiff can seek dis-
missal of the federal cause of action and move for remand.70
2. Delaying Service and Manipulating the Unanimous Consent Rule
to Defeat Removal
After receiving the complaint "through service or otherwise," the
defendant has thirty days to effect removal.71 Because the removal
deadline is statutory, it cannot be extended by stipulation. 72
Under federal law, all defendants must explicitly consent to the re-
moval of a lawsuit.73 This so-called "unanimous consent rule" is a ju-
dicial creation 74 and is predicated upon the belief that all defendants
have an equal right to remain in state court. 75 The effect of this rule is
to "give[ ] each defendant an absolute veto over removal. ' 76 A re-
moval notice will be deemed defective if, for unexplained reasons, one
of the defendants refuses to join in the petition or otherwise indicate
67. ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATrER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 23
(1997).
68. See, e.g., Nuclear Eng'g Co. v. Scott, 660 F.2d 241, 248-49 (7th Cir. 1981); Bobo v. Christus
Health, 359 F. Supp. 2d 552, 555 (E.D. Tex. 2005); Jain v. Clarendon Am. Co., 304 F. Supp. 2d
1263, 1266 (W.D. Wash. 2004).
69. See, e.g., Lott v. NationsCredit Fin. Servs. Corp., No. 4:03CV102, 2004 WL 741681, at *3
(N.D. Miss. Feb. 5, 2004); Petty v. Gulf Guar. Ins. Co., 303 F. Supp. 2d 815, 818 & n.3 (N.D. Miss.
2003); Caldwell v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 210 F. Supp. 2d 809, 811 (S.D. Miss. 2002).
70. The Fifth Circuit has held that a district court abuses its discretion by retaining jurisdiction
over a lawsuit when all federal claims have been dismissed early in the proceedings. See, e.g.,
Robertson v. Neuromedical Ctr., 161 F.3d 292, 296 (5th Cir. 1998) (per curiam); Parker & Pars-
ley Petroleum Co. v. Dresser Indus., 972 F.2d 580, 587-90 (5th Cir. 1992).
71. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (2000).
72. Ortiz v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 583 F. Supp. 526, 531 (N.D. I11. 1984). But see
Ayers v. Watson, 113 U.S. 594, 598-99 (1885) (stating that the time limit on removal could be
waived by the plaintiff because "it is not, in its nature, a jurisdictional matter, but a mere rule of
limitation").
73. See, e.g., Doe v. Kerwood, 969 F.2d 165, 168 (5th Cir. 1992); Hewitt v. City of Stanton, 798
F.2d 1230, 1232 (9th Cir. 1986) (per curiam).
74. Still v. DeBuono, 927 F. Supp. 125, 129 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (noting that the rule of unanimity
is a judicially created rule).
75. Town of Fairfax, Okla. v. Ashbrook, 3 F. Supp. 345, 346 (N.D. Okla. 1933).
76. Garside v. Osco Drug, Inc., 702 F. Supp. 19, 21 (D. Mass. 1988).
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its approval. 77 It is insufficient to merely allege that all defendants
consent to removal. 78
Federal courts have taken different approaches to the unanimity re-
quirement and the thirty-day limitation on removal. Some courts re-
quire all defendants to remove or otherwise join in the removal
petition within thirty days of the service of process upon the last de-
fendant served. 79 Other courts hold that the removal clock runs from
the time of service on the first defendant served. 80 Still others hold
that a separate removal "clock" runs for each defendant based on the
date that defendant received service. 81 Most courts follow the "first-
served" defendant rule for calculating the start of the thirty-day re-
moval time limit.82
The requirement of consent, coupled with the thirty-day time limi-
tation, allows a plaintiff to manipulate the system by "staggering" ser-
vice. For example, a plaintiff may first serve the defendant deemed
least likely to remove, and then serve the other defendants in the or-
der of their expected likelihood to seek removal. 83 In circuit courts
that have adopted the "first-served" defendant rule, the first defen-
dant may have already waived the right to remove before the other
77. See, e.g., Dorsey v. Borg-Warner Auto., Inc., 218 F. Supp. 2d 817, 819 (S.D.W. Va. 2002);
see also Shaw v. Dow Brands, Inc., 994 F.2d 364, 368 (7th Cir. 1993).
78. See, e.g., Faulk v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp., 48 F. Supp. 2d 653, 667-69 (E.D. Tex.
1999) (requiring all 185 defendants served by the plaintiff to join in the removal petition);
Codapro Corp. v. Wilson, 997 F. Supp. 322, 326 (E.D.N.Y. 1998) (finding that a letter from co-
defendants was insufficient indication of consent to removal where it was "not communicated
directly to the Court"). Each defendant is required to either execute a written consent to re-
moval or to be represented by the attorney who signs the removal papers. See Diebel v. S.B.
Trucking Co., 262 F. Supp. 2d 1319, 1329 (M.D. Fla. 2003) (remanding case where same counsel
represented all defendants at time of remand motion, but not when removal notice was filed);
Fenton v. Food Lion, Inc., No. Civ.A.3:02CV00017, 2002 WL 1969662, at *2-4 (W.D. Va. Aug.
23, 2002).
79. See, e.g., Brown v. Tokio Marine & Fire Ins. Co., 284 F.3d 871, 873 (8th Cir. 2002); Marano
Enters. of Kan. v. Z-Teca Rests., L.P., 254 F.3d 753, 756-57 (8th Cir. 2001).
80. See, e.g., N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Deshotel, 142 F.3d 873, 887 n.4 (5th Cir. 1998); Getty Oil
Corp. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 841 F.2d 1254, 1262-63 (5th Cir. 1988) ("[Tlhe thirty-day period
begins to run as soon as the first defendant is served ...."); Varney v. Johns-Manville Corp., 653
F. Supp. 839, 840 (N.D. Cal. 1987); Godman v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 588 F. Supp. 121, 123-24
(E.D. Mich. 1984); Schmidt v. NOW, 562 F. Supp. 210, 212 (N.D. Fla. 1983).
81. See, e.g., McKinney v. Bd. of Trs. of Mayland Cmty. Coll., 955 F.2d 924, 928 (4th Cir.
1992).
82. See McAnally Enters., Inc. v. McAnally, 107 F. Supp. 2d 1223, 1226-28 (C.D. Cal. 2000)
(discussing majority rule and courts upholding same). Once the first-served defendant answers
the lawsuit, or its thirty-day period to remove has expired, courts adopting the "first-served" rule
reason that the first-served defendant's act of answering the state case or failing to timely re-
move demonstrates its lack of consent to removal. Id. at 1227; see also United Computer Sys.,
Inc. v. AT&T Corp., 298 F.3d 756, 762 (9th Cir. 2002).
83. Auchinleck v. Town of LaGrange, 167 F. Supp. 2d 1066, 1070 (E.D. Wis. 2001).
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defendants have been served . 4 By carefully timing service of process
upon different defendants, plaintiffs can effectively strip later defend-
ants of their right to removal.8 5
Recently, Congress created a limited exception to the unanimous
consent rule in the context of class actions. Under the Class Action
Fairness Act (CAFA),86 defendants in a class action qualifying under
the requirements set forth in that Act can unilaterally remove the ac-
tion to federal court without the consent of any other defendants.8 7
3. Suing Nondiverse Defendants to Defeat Removal
Joinder of a nondiverse party as a defendant may be used by a
plaintiff to defeat a diverse defendant's ability to remove a case to
federal court. The federal courts will treat a nominal nondiverse de-
fendant as a real defendant, unless no claim could possibly be brought
against a nondiverse defendant under state law.8s The court, however,
has an obligation and duty to protect the diverse defendant's right to
be in federal court.8 9 It is the joinder of an indispensable party under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19 that destroys diversity jurisdic-
tion.90 A joinder is fraudulent if the plaintiff lacks any possibility of
having a joint claim against a joined party.91 Even though a plaintiff
has a claim arising under the same area of law against common de-
fendants, if the facts that form the basis for the claim are unique, there
is no significant identity between the claim from a factual or legal
standpoint that would justify joinder.92
The plaintiff may also assert that multiple defendants are alterna-
tively liable. In order to present an alternative claim against multiple
defendants, there must be a clear statement that there was harm to the
plaintiff and a showing that the plaintiff is unable to identify which
defendant should be liable. 93 If a nondiverse defendant, for example,
84. Brown v. Demco, Inc., 792 F.2d 478, 481-82 (5th Cir. 1986).
85. Auchinleck, 167 F. Supp. 2d at 1070.
86. Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005); see infra notes 173-190 and accompanying text.
87. Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4; see also Werner v. KPMG L.L.P., 415 F. Supp. 2d 688,
693-94 (S.D. Tex. 2006); In re Textainer P'ship Sec. Litig., No. C 05-0969 MMC, 2005 WL
1791559, at *3 (N.D. Cal. July 27, 2005).
88. See, e.g., Whitaker v. Am. Telecasting, Inc., 261 F.3d 196, 207 (2d Cir. 2001).
89. Filippini v. Ford Motor Co., 110 F.R.D. 131, 133 (N.D. Ill. 1986); Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v.
Fibreboard Prods., Inc., 116 F. Supp. 377, 381 (N.D. Cal. 1953) (denying leave to amend to
prevent plaintiffs from defeating defendant's right of removal).
90. See Salem Trust Co. v. Mfrs.' Fin. Co., 264 U.S. 182, 189-90 (1924).
91. Burns v. W. S. Life Ins. Co., 298 F. Supp. 2d 401, 402 (S.D.W. Va. 2004) (citing 14B
WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 22, § 3723).
92. Id.
93. Taiyo Trading Co. v. Northam Trading Corp., 1 F.R.D. 382, 383-84 (S.D.N.Y. 1940).
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is joined in a lawsuit with a diverse defendant based on the breach of a
contract, the nondiverse defendant is considered a necessary and
proper party only if the nondiverse defendant is a signatory to the
contract.94 If a nondiverse defendant commits a tort separate and
apart from the contract, then that defendant is not a necessary party
to the lawsuit and cannot be joined pursuant to Rule 19. 95
One court explained, "[t]he proper remedy in case of misjoinder is
to grant severance or dismissal to the improper party [pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 21] if it will not prejudice any sub-
stantial right."' 96 Rule 21 authorizes a state court to sever a claim even
if there is no improper joinder. 97 If a plaintiff could improperly join a
nondiverse defendant, thereby precluding the diverse defendant from
removing to federal court, state court jurisdiction would encroach
upon federal matters in violation of the applicable procedural rules.98
Once the state court has granted a motion to sever or to drop a nondi-
verse defendant, the diverse defendant can then remove the case to
federal court.
The Supreme Court has held that "it is well settled that Rule 21
invests district courts with authority to allow a dispensable nondiverse
party to be dropped at any time, even after judgment has been ren-
dered." 99 Thus, a district court has the authority to determine issues
of improper joinder after the lawsuit is removed: 100
[A] defendant may remove a civil action on the basis of diversity
jurisdiction and seek to persuade the district court that any non-
diverse defendants were fraudulently joined. A non-diverse defen-
94. See Lomayaktewa v. Hathaway, 520 F.2d 1324, 1325 (9th Cir. 1975); Nason v. Voight, 625
P.2d 974, 975 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1981) (explaining that a joint tenant who was a party to the agree-
ment was a "necessary and proper party" to the lawsuit).
95. Fid. & Cas. Co. of N.Y. v. Tillman Corp., 112 F.3d 302, 304 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding that a
broker who stole premium payments was not an "indispensable party" in workers' compensation
insurer's suit against insured to recover premium).
96. Sabolsky v. Budzanoski, 457 F.2d 1245, 1249 (3d Cir. 1972); accord Anrig v. Ringsby
United, 603 F.2d 1319, 1325 (9th Cir. 1979) (holding that courts should either sever or dismiss
dispensable parties pursuant to Rule 21); Am. Fid. Fire Ins. Co. v. Construcciones Werl, Inc., 407
F. Supp. 164, 190 (D.V.I. 1975) (noting Rule 21 allows the court to sever unrelated claims and to
proceed separately with the misjoined claims).
97. Wyndham Assocs. v. Bintliff, 398 F.2d 614, 618 (2d Cir. 1968).
98. See FED. R. Civ. P. 82; see also Locke Mfg. Co. v. Sabel, 244 F. Supp. 829, 830-31 (W.D.
Ky. 1965) (holding that Rule 82 was created to avoid the unwarranted extension or diminution of
federal court jurisdiction through misuse of the joinder provisions).
99. Newman-Green, Inc. v. Alfonzo-Larrain, 490 U.S. 826, 832 (1989).
100. Lee v. Lehigh Valley Coal Co., 267 U.S. 542, 543 (1925) ("When a defendant seeks to
remove a suit from a State Court to the District Court, of course he is entitled to contend that a
party joined by the plaintiff is not a necessary party and therefore does not make the removal
impossible by defeating the jurisdiction."); see also Tex. Employers Ins. Ass'n v. Felt, 150 F.2d
227, 230-31 (5th Cir. 1945).
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dant is fraudulently joined, if it can be shown that no cause of action
has been alleged by the plaintiff and the plaintiff's failure is obvious
under settled state law. 10 1
The notice of removal should indicate that the nondiverse defendant
is improperly or fraudulently joined.10 2 If the federal court finds that
there is an improper joinder or misjoinder, the court may order the
pleadings reformed or remand the portion of the case that relates to
the nondiverse defendant. 10 3
4. Manipulating the Amount in Controversy
Incredibly, the defendant's attorney often argues that the damages
exceed the statutory limit, while the plaintiff's attorney often argues
that they are less than the statutory limit. In Shaw v. Dow Brands,
Inc.,10 4 the court explained the comical scene it witnessed during oral
argument: "[P]laintiff's personal injury lawyer protests up and down
that his client's injuries are as minor and insignificant as can be, while
attorneys for the manufacturer paint a sob story about how plaintiff's
life has been wrecked." 10 5
The amount in controversy in diversity cases is determined from the
record existing at the time the removal petition is filed. 10 6 At this
stage of the proceedings, a wide variety of resources may be available
to establish the amount in controversy, including affidavits, statements
of counsel, settlement offers, and other correspondence between the
parties. 0 7
101. Zogbi v. Federated Dep't Store, 767 F. Supp. 1037, 1041 (C.D. Cal. 1991) (citing McCabe
v. Gen. Foods Corp., 811 F.2d 1336, 1339 (9th Cir. 1987)).
102. The notice of removal may incorporate by reference arguments contained in pleadings
filed in state court, notwithstanding that it did not contain any specific reference to misjoinder.
See, e.g., United States v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 908-09 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that the court
may consider documents referenced extensively in pleading when ruling upon motion); O'Bryan
v. Chandler, 496 F.2d 403, 410-11 (10th Cir. 1974) (determining the ability to remove by consid-
ering the state court complaint, the petition to remove, and any other documents). In addition,
the notice of removal can be construed as implicitly amended by state court pleadings. Willing-
ham v. Morgan, 395 U.S. 402, 407 n.3 (1969) ("[Ijt is proper to treat the removal petition as if it
had been amended to include the relevant information contained in the later-filed affidavits."
(citing 28 U.S.C. § 1653 (1964))); Cohn v. Petsmart, Inc., 281 F.3d 837, 840 n.1 (9th Cir. 2002)
(construing the petition to remove amended so as to properly allege jurisdiction under
§ 1441(a)); Harper v. Nat'l Flood Insurers Ass'n, 494 F. Supp. 234, 236 (M.D. Pa. 1980) (same).
103. Lee, 267 U.S. at 543.
104. 994 F.2d 364 (7th Cir. 1993).
105. Id. at 366.
106. See, e.g., Gardynski-Leschuck v. Ford Motor Co., 142 F.3d 955. 958 (7th Cir. 1998) ("Un-
less the amount in controversy was present on the date the case began, the suit must be dis-
missed for want of jurisdiction.").
107. See McIntire v. Ford Motor Co., 142 F. Supp. 2d 911, 915 (S.D. Ohio 2001) (citing Ohio
Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 922 F.2d 320, 325 (6th Cir. 1990)). In Brewer v. State Farm
Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., the defendant produced the following evidence to establish
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The Supreme Court has not established a framework to determine
the amount in controversy,108 and circuit courts are split on this issue.
In Mississippi & Missouri Railroad v. Ward, a steamboat owner
brought a nuisance claim against the defendant who built a bridge
across a river used by the steamboat owner, and the Court did not
clarify whether the "value of the object" referred to the value of the
bridge, the value of the steamboat business, the cost of removing the
bridge, or the value of the plaintiff's right to be free of the obstruc-
tion. 10 9 Most federal courts adopt one of the following viewpoints:
(1) the plaintiff's viewpoint; (2) the viewpoint of the party seeking
jurisdiction; or (3) the "either party" viewpoint.
a. Plaintiff's Viewpoint Rule
The Second Circuit, 110 Third Circuit,' Fifth Circuit," 2 Eighth Cir-
cuit," 3 and Eleventh Circuit 1 4 have adopted the plaintiff's viewpoint
approach. Under the longstanding rule adopted by the Supreme
the amount in controversy: "(1) plaintiff's insurance policy, (2) other cases and state laws re-
garding punitive damages, (3) other cases involving awards for emotional distress, and (4) plain-
tiffs' refusal to sign an agreement not to execute a judgment in excess of $75,000." 101 F. Supp.
2d 737, 740 (S.D. Ind. 2000). Although the court conceded this evidence suggested a possibility
that the amount in controversy was satisfied, the court ultimately held that "defendants [did] not
provide sufficient factual information" to estimate the amount of damages potentially recover-
able under the specific case at bar. Id. at 741.
108. Glenwood Light & Water Co. v. Mut. Light, Heat & Power Co., 239 U.S. 121, 124-25
(1915).
109. 67 U.S. (2 Black) 485, 492 (1862); see also Glenwood Light, 239 U.S. at 126 (finding that
the plaintiff's right to be free from interference exceeded the amount in controversy).
110. Kheel v. Port of N.Y. Auth., 457 F.2d 46, 49 (2d Cir. 1972) ("[T]he amount in controversy
is calculated from the plaintiff's standpoint .... ").
111. In re Corestates Trust Fee Litig., 39 F.3d 61, 65 (3d Cir. 1994) ("[Almount in controversy
in an injunctive action is measured by the value to plaintiff to conduct his business or personal
affairs free from the activity sought to be enjoined.").
112. Alfonso v. Hillsborough County Aviation Auth., 308 F.2d 724, 727 (5th Cir. 1962) ("The
value to the plaintiff of the right to be enforced or protected determines the amount in
controversy.").
113. Mass. State Pharm. Ass'n v. Fed. Prescription Serv., Inc., 431 F.2d 130, 132 (8th Cir. 1970)
("The amount in controversy is tested by the value of the suit's intended benefit to the plain-
tiff."). The Eighth Circuit view is somewhat unclear. For example, the court allows compensa-
tory damages, the value of injunctive relief, punitive damages, and attorney's fees to be
considered in calculating the amount in controversy. See Burns v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 820
F.2d 246, 248 (8th Cir. 1987) (value of injunctive relief); Allison v. Sec. Benefit Life Ins. Co., 980
F.2d 1213, 1215 (8th Cir. 1992) (punitive damages); Capitol Indem. Corp. v. Miles, 978 F.2d 437,
438 (8th Cir. 1992) (attorney's fees).
114. Ericsson GE Mobile Comm'cns, Inc. v. Motorola Comm'cns & Elecs., Inc., 120 F.3d 216,
218-19 (11th Cir. 1997) (holding that "uncertainty as to whether the plaintiff-viewpoint rule
governs in this circuit or whether courts are free to consider the value of the object of the litiga-
tion to either party," is resolved by adoption of plaintiff's viewpoint rule).
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Court in St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Co. v. Red Cab Co.,1" 5 a plaintiff
can prevent geographically diverse defendants from removing to fed-
eral court if the plaintiff is willing to seek damages below the federal
jurisdictional limits. 116 The plaintiff's viewpoint rule is anchored in
the traditional belief that the plaintiff is the master of the forum.117
Under this belief, the plaintiff is entitled to select the court system in
which to bring the claim. 118
Under the plaintiff's viewpoint rule, a plaintiff may manipulate the
pleadings to defeat the constitutional purpose of diversity jurisdic-
tion.1 19 A plaintiff can initially undervalue the claim while actually
seeking and obtaining damages in excess of the requirement. 120 A
plaintiff can later amend the complaint to increase the value of dam-
ages sought.121 If the amendment occurs more than one year after the
cutoff date, the defendant will be powerless to remove, notwithstand-
ing that diversity of citizenship and the amount in controversy exist.122
Federal diversity jurisdiction should secure "a tribunal presumed to
be more impartial than a court of the State in which one of the liti-
gants resides. ' 123 Diversity jurisdiction was created to protect out-of-
state defendants from possible local bias by judges. 124 Manipulating
115. 303 U.S. 283 (1938).
116. Id. at 294 (stating that to avoid removal a plaintiff "may resort to the expedient of suing
for less than the jurisdictional amount, and though he would be justly entitled to more, the
defendant cannot remove").
117. De Aguilar v. Boeing Co., 47 F.3d 1404, 1411-12 (5th Cir. 1995) (explaining that in order
for a defendant to overcome the presumptive accuracy of plaintiff's alleged damage figure, the
defendant must establish the threshold jurisdictional amount is a "legal certainty").
118. 14C WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 40, § 3725.
119. Lane v. Champion Int'l Corp., 844 F. Supp. 724, 731-32 (S.D. Ala. 1994).
120. Shaw v. Dow Brands, Inc., 994 F.2d 364, 366 (7th Cir. 1993); Parnell v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 173 F.R.D. 446, 447 (W.D. Ky. 1997); Hicks v. Universal Hous., Inc., 792 F. Supp.
482, 484 (S.D.W. Va. 1992).
121. FED. R. Civ. P. 15(a).
122. Eastus v. Blue Bell Creameries, L.P., 97 F.3d 100, 106 (5th Cir. 1996) ("[R]emoval stat-
utes are to be construed strictly against removal ...."); see also Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v.
Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 108 (1941) ("[T]he policy of the successive acts of Congress regulating the
jurisdiction of federal courts is one calling for the strict construction of such legislation.").
123. Barrow Steamship Co. v. Kane, 170 U.S. 100, 111 (1898).
124. Pease v. Peck, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 595, 599 (1855) ("The theory upon which jurisdiction is
conferred on the courts of the United States, in controversies between citizens of different
States, has its foundation in the supposition that, possibly the state tribunal might not be impar-
tial between their own citizens and foreigners."); Davis v. Carl Cannon Chevrolet-Olds, Inc., 182
F.3d 792, 797 (11th Cir. 1999) ("An important historical justification for diversity jurisdiction is
the reassurance of fairness and competence that a federal court can supply to an out-of-state
defendant facing suit in state court."); In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. Sales Pracs. Litig., 148
F.3d 283, 305 (3d Cir. 1998). Commentators are divided on whether bias exists among state
court judges. Compare Neuborne, supra note 7, at 1120-21 (arguing that elected state judges are
more affected by majoritarian pressure than life-tenured federal judges), with Henry J. Friendly,
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the amount in controversy by misrepresenting the true value of relief
sought, only to increase the demand after the threat of removal has
passed, can have wide-reaching consequences.
The plaintiff's viewpoint rule interferes with Congress's intent to
provide federal jurisdiction for claims of large value between citizens
of different states.125 One concern is whether a state judge would ac-
tually enforce the interests of the public at large for a claim or class
action affecting nationwide interests.1 2 6 Under the plaintiff's view-
point rule, a state court could decide claims where the outcome might
affect the practices and policies of companies engaged in interstate
commerce. 127 This is of particular concern where a plaintiff requests
injunctive relief that could later alter the national policy of large cor-
porations or affect the commercial activities in several states. In the
area of insurance, such wide-sweeping authority could impinge upon
the prerogative of other states to regulate the business of insurance
within their own borders. In this type of situation, federal courts
would provide more efficient decisionmaking than state courts.' 28
Recently, federal courts adopting the plaintiff's viewpoint rule are
permitting defendants to challenge the validity of a specifically
pleaded damage amount.129 This approach requires the court to de-
The Historical Basis of Diversity Jurisdiction, 41 HARV. L. REV. 483, 493 (1928) (arguing no bias
of state judges).
125. See BEM I, L.L.C. v. Anthropologie, Inc., 301 F.3d 548, 553 (7th Cir. 2002); In re Ford
Motor Co./Citibank, 264 F.3d 952, 961 (9th Cir. 2001); Hatridge v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 415
F.2d 809, 815 (8th Cir. 1969).
126. See John H. Beisner & Jessica Davidson Miller, They're Making a Federal Case out of It
... in State Court, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 143, 176-77 (2001) ("The ability of one locally
elected judge to exercise that much power raises serious federalism questions."). Commentators
studying this issue have noted its interesting results:
The willingness of certain Illinois state courts to serve as free-roving insurance commis-
sioners and issue edicts that affect the way insurance companies can do business in
forty-nine other states may explain why twenty-six class action lawsuits have been filed
in Madison County against insurance companies in the last few years.
Id. at 175. Commentators further note that "[o]ne Madison County judge could be single-
handedly responsible for dramatically increasing the price of automobile insurance ... and ad-
versely affecting the . . . automobile parts industry." Id. at 176.
127. See id.
128. Proponents of strict removal limitations argue that the federal dockets are overloaded
and backlogged. See 14C WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 40, § 3725. However, this
criticism ignores the difference in resources available between federal and state courts, and that
state court dockets are also crowded.
129. See, e.g., McCool v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., No. 4:98CV71-B-B, 1998 WL 527280, at
*1 (N.D. Miss. July 20, 1998) (permitting challenge of specifically pleaded damages of $74,480
because the plaintiff possibly could amend the pleading to seek more); Parnell v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 173 F.R.D. 446, 447 (W.D. Ky. 1997) (allowing challenge because a plaintiff
may claim an artificially low damage amount to defeat jurisdiction while actually seeking and
obtaining damages in excess of the requirement); Lane v. Champion Int'l Corp., 844 F. Supp.
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termine the appropriate burden of proof a defendant must meet to
establish that the true amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdic-
tional minimum. 130 These courts have formulated three different
standards to establish the burden: (1) the "reverse legal certainty"
standard;1M (2) the "preponderance of the evidence" standard;132 and
(3) the "legal certainty" standard. 133
Under the "reverse legal certainty" standard, 134 a defendant must
establish that it is not legally certain that the plaintiff will recover less
than the jurisdictional amount, or that there is a probability that the
plaintiff will recover more than the jurisdictional amount.1 35 This is
the most lenient of the three approaches because it posits that the
removing defendant has substantially the same burden that a plaintiff
has under the "legal certainty" test.136
The "preponderance of evidence" standard requires a defendant to
show that it is more likely than not that the amount in controversy
724, 731-32 (S.D. Ala. 1994) (allowing challenge because plaintiff may manipulate pleadings to
defeat diversity jurisdiction); Corwin Jeep Sales & Serv., Inc. v. Am. Motor Sales Corp., 670 F.
Supp. 591, 596 (M.D. Pa. 1986) (plaintiff may not defeat removal by seeking less than the juris-
dictional amount when court is informed that amount in controversy exceeds required amount);
Steele v. Underwriters Adjusting Co., 649 F. Supp. 1414, 1416 (M.D. Ala. 1986) ("A plaintiff
should not be allowed to deprive a defendant of his right to remove through artful pleading
practices.").
130. See Burns v. Windsor Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1092, 1095-96 (11th Cir. 1994) ("So, the critical
question is to what extent must defendant prove jurisdiction exists despite plaintiff's express
claim to less than the minimum jurisdictional sum?").
131. See Kliebert v. Upjohn Co., 915 F.2d 142, 147-48 (5th Cir. 1990) (Jolly, J., dissenting),
vacated for rehearing en banc 923 F.2d 47 (5th Cir.), appeal dismissed per stipulation of settlement
947 F.2d 736 (5th Cir. 1991).
132. See De Aguilar v. Boeing Co., 47 F.3d 1404, 1412 (5th Cir. 1995) (establishing "prepon-
derance of the evidence" standard as equitable burden for removing defendant).
133. See Burns, 31 F.3d at 1095-96.
134. Courts have also referred to the "reverse legal certainty" standard as the "converse legal
certainty" standard. See De Aguilar, 47 F.3d at 1411.
135. Kliebert, 915 F.2d at 146 (observing that several district courts have adopted the "reverse
legal certainty" test where plaintiff has not specified the damages being sought). The defendant
must show that there is a probability that the amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional
minimum. Id.; see also Corwin Jeep Sales & Serv., Inc. v. Am. Motor Sales Corp., 670 F. Supp.
591, 595 (M.D. Pa. 1986) (explaining that the claim is not legally certain to be less than the
jurisdictional amount if there is a probability that the claim exceeds the jurisdictional amount).
136. Kliebert, 915 F.2d at 149 (Jolly, J., dissenting). This rationale was rejected by the court in
Burns. 31 F.3d at 1095 ("Defendant's right to remove and plaintiff's right to choose his forum
are not on equal footing; for example, unlike the rules applied when plaintiff has filed suit in
federal court with a claim that, on its face, satisfies the jurisdictional amount, removal statutes
are construed narrowly .. "). The Sixth Circuit and Ninth Circuit have also found this standard
to be too permissive. See, e.g., Gafford v. Gen. Elec. Co., 997 F.2d 150, 158-59 (6th Cir. 1993);
Sanchez v. Monumental Life Ins. Co., 102 F.3d 398, 403 (9th Cir. 1996). These courts have
opined that adoption of the "some possibility" standard, even where the plaintiff has not speci-
fied damages in the complaint, unreasonably expands federal diversity jurisdiction. See, e.g.,
Burns, 31 F.3d at 1096-97.
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exceeds the jurisdictional minimum. 37 It has been favorably viewed
by commentators as an equitable standard that establishes equilibrium
between a plaintiff's initial right to select a forum and a removing de-
fendant's right to seek a federal forum in a jurisdictionally qualifying
case.138 This approach has been used primarily in cases where the
damages are unspecified because courts utilizing this approach believe
that the defendant's burden should be lighter than it is when insuffi-
cient damages have actually been alleged.1 39
Courts have also utilized the "legal certainty" standard where a
plaintiff pleads damages in excess of the jurisdictional amount. 140
Under this standard, it has been held that the sum claimed by the
plaintiff will control if the claim is made in good faith. The defendant
must therefore prove to a legal certainty that the claim does not in fact
satisfy the jurisdictional amount. 141 Courts adhering to this standard
give significant weight to the amount claimed by the plaintiff. 142 This
is especially true where the complaint was originally filed in state
court because these courts believe that it is "highly unlikely in that
instance that the plaintiff would have inflated his request for damages
solely to obtain federal jurisdiction."1 43
137. Hayfield v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 168 F. Supp. 2d 436, 454 n.12 (E.D. Pa. 2001);
Penn v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 116 F. Supp. 2d 557, 562 (D.N.J. 2000); In re Cardizem CD Anti-
trust Litig., 90 F. Supp. 2d 819, 823 (E.D. Mich. 1999).
138. See Lawrence W. Moore, Federal Jurisdiction & Procedure, 41 Loy. L. REV. 469, 481
(1995) (concluding that the "preponderance of evidence" approach "seems a sensible and dura-
ble equilibrium point on which to balance the parties' interests"); Quentin F. Urquhart, Jr.,
Amount in Controversy and Removal: Current Trends and Strategic Considerations, 62 DEF.
COUNS. J., 509, 515-19 (1995). Courts have shared this view. See Tapscott v. MS Dealer Serv.
Corp., 77 F.3d 1353, 1357 (lth Cir. 1996) ("The proper balance between a plaintiff's right to
choose his forum and a defendant's right to remove, without unnecessarily expanding federal
diversity jurisdiction, is struck by a 'preponderance of the evidence' standard."); Gafford, 997
F.2d at 160 ("We believe that the mean between the extremes unsettles to the least extent the
balance struck between the defendant's right to remove and the federal interest in limiting diver-
sity jurisdiction.").
139. See Tapscott, 77 F.3d at 1356-57 ("Where a plaintiff has made an unspecified demand for
damages, a lower burden of proof is warranted because there is simply no estimate of damages
to which a court may defer."); Sanchez, 102 F.3d at 403 (noting that the "preponderance of the
evidence" burden represents an appropriate balance between competing interests where unspec-
ified damages are at issue at the time of removal); Gafford, 997 F.2d at 160 (holding that "strict
legal certainty" should not apply where amount in controversy is indeterminate).
140. See, e.g., Sanchez, 102 F.3d at 402 (holding test applicable where plaintiff pleads damages
in excess of the jurisdictional amount); Allen v. R&H Oil & Gas Co., 63 F.3d 1326, 1335 (5th Cit.
1995); McCorkindale v. Am. Home Assurance Co., 909 F. Supp. 646, 650-51 (N.D. Iowa 1995).
141. See, e.g., Sanchez, 102 F.3d at 402.
142. Id.
143. Id. (quoting Garza v. Bettcher Indus., Inc., 752 F. Supp. 753, 755-56 (E.D. Mich. 1990)).
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b. Viewpoint of Party Seeking Jurisdiction
Some courts consider only the defendant's perspective on the
amount in controversy. 44 The defendant then has the burden of
proving the amount in controversy based on "the sum or value of that
which the defendant will lose if the complainant succeeds in his
suit. ' 145 This viewpoint has been adopted by some district courts, but
it-does not have circuit court acceptance.146  Where courts have
adopted this viewpoint, a plaintiff cannot manipulate the amount in
controversy requirement to defeat removal.
c. Either Party Viewpoint
The either party viewpoint 147 has been adopted by the First Cir-
cuit, 148 the Seventh Circuit,'149 the Ninth Circuit, 150 and the Tenth Cir-
cuit. 15t The either party viewpoint permits a reconciliation of the
scattered case law in which lower courts have given acceptance to
both the plaintiff's viewpoint and the defendant's viewpoint in assess-
ing the amount in controversy. The either party viewpoint is most
144. See 14B WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 22, § 3703.
145. Bergstrom v. Burlington N. R.R., 895 F. Supp. 257, 261 (D.N.D. 1995) (quoting Cowell v.
City Water Supply Co., 121 F. 53, 57 (8th Cir. 1903)).
146. See, e.g., id.; Solna, Inc. v. Am. Printing Equip., Inc., No. 89-0715-CV-W-5, 1989 WL
325976, at *3 (W.D. Mo. Sept. 20, 1989); Family Motor Inn, Inc. v. L-K Enters. Div. Consol.
Foods Corp., 369 F. Supp. 766, 769 (E.D. Ky. 1973); Inman v. Milwhite Co., 261 F. Supp. 703, 708
(E.D. Ark. 1966).
147. See Justice v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 927 F.2d 503, 505 (10th Cir. 1991)
("[Tihe amount in controversy may be established by looking at the defendant's cost of comply-
ing with the injunction. Moreover, the vast majority of courts have measured the amount in
controversy in injunction cases by looking at either the cost to the defendant or the value to the
plaintiff." (citation omitted)); Gov't Employees Ins. Co. v. Lally, 327 F.2d 568, 569 (4th Cir.
1964) ("The test of 'value to either party' in determining the amount in controversy is especially
appropriate where, as here, an insurance company[] [is] insuring a defendant being sued in a
state action for an amount far in excess of [the jurisdictional amount] ...."); Crosby v. AOL, 967
F. Supp. 257, 264 (N.D. Ohio 1997) (holding the either party viewpoint rule "makes the most
sense, because the amount in controversy in a lawsuit exceeds [$75,000] if either the plaintiff or
defendant will have to pay that amount") (alteration in original) (quoting ERWIN CHEMERINSKY,
FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 5.3.4 (2d ed. 1994)); Smith v. Washington, 593 F.2d 1097, 1099 (D.C.
Cir. 1978) ("In assessing whether a complaint satisfies [legal certainty] standard, a court may
look either to 'the value of the right that plaintiff seeks to enforce or to protect' or to the cost to
the defendants to remedy the alleged denial." (citation omitted)).
148. See Berman v. Narragansett Racing Ass'n, 414 F.2d 311, 314-15 (1st Cir. 1969).
149. See In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., 123 F.3d 599, 609 (7th Cir.
1997).
150. See Sanchez v. Monumental Life Ins. Co., 102 F.3d 398, 405 (9th Cir. 1996).
151. See Okla. Retail Grocers Ass'n v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 605 F.2d 1155, 1159 (10th Cir.
1979); Ronzio v. Denver & Rio Grande W. R.R., 116 F.2d 604, 606 (10th Cir. 1940).
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consistent with the general framework used by the Supreme Court for
determining the amount in controversy. 152
This viewpoint allows the court flexibility in determining the true
amount in controversy where either an "indeterminate complaint" or
a "lowball complaint" are in question. 153 This approach minimizes the
manipulation of the amount in controversy requirement except in
those situations where the true damages are reasonably close to the
$75,000 threshold.154
5. Using the Nonaggregation Rule to Defeat Removal in Class
Actions
The nonaggregation rule precludes the aggregation of the claims of
class members to establish the threshold jurisdictional amount. 155 In
Troy Bank v. Whitehead & Co., 15 6 the Court stated the nonaggrega-
tion rule as follows: "When two or more plaintiffs, having separate
and distinct demands, unite for a convenience and economy in a single
suit, it is essential that the demand of each be of the requisite jurisdic-
tional amount .... ,,157 The Court also recognized in Troy Bank an
oft-stated exception to the rule: "[W]hen several plaintiffs unite to en-
force a single title or right, in which they have a common and undi-
vided interest, it is enough if their interests collectively equal the
jurisdictional amount."'1 58 Thus, commentators have observed that
claims by multiple plaintiffs may not be aggregated unless the claims
are "joint," "common," or "undivided. "159
The Court noted in Snyder v. Harris160 that aggregation has been
permitted in two circumstances: "(1) in cases in which a single plain-
152. See Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333,347 (1977) ("[T]he amount
in controversy is measured by the value of the object of the litigation."); Thomson v. Gaskill, 315
U.S. 442, 447 (1942) (measuring the value by the "pecuniary consequence to those involved in
the litigation").
153. See Alice M. Noble-Allgire, Removal of Diversity Actions When the Amount in Contro-
versy Cannot Be Determined from the Face of Plaintiffs Complaint: The Need for Judicial and
Statutory Reform to Preserve Defendant's Equal Access to Federal Courts, 62 Mo. L. REv. 681,
699-728, 754 (1997) (concluding that the federal judiciary can begin to resolve much of the con-
flict "by adopting a single, uniform standard for determining whether the amount in controversy
requirement has been satisfied").
154. Brittain Shaw Mclnnis, Comment, The $75,000.01 Question: What Is the Value of Injunc-
tive Relief?, 6 GEo. MASON L. REv. 1013, 1032 (1998).
155. Zahn v. Int'l Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291, 294-95 (1973); Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 338
(1969).
156. 222 U.S. 39 (1911).
157. Id. at 40.
158. Id. at 40-41.
159. 4 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTiCE § 20.07[2] (Matthew Bender 3d ed. 2004).
160. 394 U.S. 332.
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tiff seeks to aggregate two or more of his own claims against a single
defendant and (2) in cases in which two or more plaintiffs unite to
enforce a single title or right in which they have a common and undi-
vided interest.' 61 Thus, aggregation is allowed when two or more
plaintiffs join together in a suit out of necessity because they have one
right to enforce, but may not be allowed in class actions when plain-
tiffs with separate and distinct rights are allowed to join similar claims
for reasons of judicial economy. 162
In those jurisdictions which have rejected the defendant's viewpoint
in class actions, the courts typically hold that the "common and undi-
vided interest" exception to the nonaggregation rule does not apply
because "[r]ecovery by one plaintiff ... would not, as a legal matter,
either preclude or reduce recovery by another.' 63 The exception ap-
plies only "where a defendant 'owes an obligation to the group of
plaintiffs as a group and not to the individuals severally."' 164 This ex-
ception typically applies in those jurisdictions where there is a "single
indivisible res" jointly owned by the plaintiffs that creates an undi-
vided obligation to them.' 65 Under this approach, where the claims of
the class members are "cognizable, calculable, and correctable indi-
vidually," the class members-or the removing defendant-may not
aggregate claims to meet the amount in controversy.1 66
Aggregation is beneficial from a defendant's perspective because
the defendant can aggregate to establish jurisdiction for a federal fo-
rum when individual plaintiffs could not do so relative to their claims.
The Third Circuit 67 and Eleventh Circuit 168 have rejected the defen-
dant's viewpoint approach in class actions.
In order to permit a defendant's viewpoint approach in class ac-
tions, the court must alternatively (1) apportion among the plaintiffs
the value alleged by the defendant; (2) reject the nonaggregation rule
161. Id. at 335.
162. Id. at 334-35; see also Zahn v. Int'l Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291, 298-99 (1973).
163. Gibson v. Chrysler Corp., 261 F.3d 927, 945 (9th Cir. 2001).
164. Id. at 944 (quoting Morrison v. Allstate Indem. Co., 228 F.3d 1255, 1262 (11th Cir. 2000)).
165. Id.; see also Eagle v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 769 F.2d 541, 546 (9th Cir. 1985).
166. Gibson, 261 F.3d at 945; accord Potrero Hill Cmt'y Action Comm. v. Hous. Auth. of S.F.,
410 F.2d 974, 978 (9th Cir. 1969).
167. See Packard v. Provident Nat'l Bank, 994 F.2d 1039, 1045 (3d Cir. 1993). However, the
Seventh Circuit has allowed the defendant's costs of compliance to provide a basis for federal
subject-matter jurisdiction. See In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., 123 F.3d
599, 609-10 (7th Cir. 1997).
168. See Cohen v. Office Depot, Inc., 204 F.3d 1069, 1077 (11th Cir. 2000).
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or limit it to specific case type; or (3) expand the concept of the com-
mon and undivided right.169
The most prevalent view requires a defendant to prorate its compli-
ance costs among all class members. 170 This approach prevents trivial
claims from being brought to a federal forum. Some courts have ap-
plied the nonaggregation rule to claims for compensatory damages
while suspending its application in cases where injunctive relief is
sought.171 Other courts have expanded the scope of the nonaggrega-
tion rule's exception. These courts define a "common and undivided
interest" to include claims where the remedy would be the same re-
gardless of the number of plaintiffs joined in the suit.1 72 However,
under CAFA, there is a subset of class actions in which the aggrega-
tion of claims is not permitted.1 73 CAFA provides that "a mass action
shall be deemed to be a class action removable" under the Act if it
otherwise satisfies the qualifying requirements set forth therein. 174
CAFA defines the term "mass action" as "any civil action .... in
which monetary relief claims of 100 or more persons are proposed to
be tried jointly on the ground that the plaintiffs' claims involve com-
mon questions of law or fact.' 75 In other words, mass actions are
169. Greta N. Hininger, Law Summary, Two Heads Are Better Than One: Making a Case for
the Either Party Viewpoint for Removal, 69 Mo. L. REv. 275, 294-95 (2004).
170. See, e.g., Snow v. Ford Motor Co., 561 F.2d 787, 791 (9th Cir. 1977); Mclntire v. Ford
Motor Co., 142 F. Supp. 2d 911, 923 (S.D. Ohio 2001).
171. See, e.g., Justice v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 927 F.2d 503, 505 (10th Cir. 1991);
McCoy v. Erie Ins. Co., 147 F. Supp. 2d 481, 492 (S.D.W. Va. 2001) ("[A]mount in controversy
can be satisfied by demonstrating that the injunctive relief would require the defendant to alter
his method of doing business in such a manner that would cost at least the statutory minimum."
(quoting Mclnnis, supra note 154, at 1016)).
172. See In re Brand Name, 123 F.3d at 610 (applying the "one plaintiff' test). A district court
has also addressed the issue:
Plaintiffs seek injunctive relief that will benefit the class as a whole. Defendants' costs
of compliance [did] not depend upon the size of the class or the identity of its members.
Accordingly, it is based upon a common and undivided interest and constitutes an inte-
grated claim; its entire value may be considered when determining whether the
amount-in-controversy requirement for diversity jurisdiction is satisfied ....
In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 90 F. Supp. 2d 819, 836 (E.D. Mich. 1999); accord Edge v.
Blockbuster Video, Inc., 10 F. Supp. 2d 1248, 1254-56 (N.D. Ala. 1997) (stating that where a
"course of conduct as a whole" would be prohibited by injunction or would inure to the "collec-
tive good" of the class was common and undivided, the case should be valued from the defen-
dant's viewpoint for purposes of the amount in controversy); Earnest v. Gen. Motors Corp., 923
F. Supp. 1469, 1472 (N.D. Ala. 1996) (holding that a class has undivided interest); Loizon v.
SMH Societe Suisse De Microelectronics, 950 F. Supp. 250, 254 (N.D. I11. 1996) (holding that
class members "have a common and undivided interest in the injunctive relief' because "only
the class, and not individual class members, could request the injunctive relief").
173. Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005).
174. Id.
175. Id.
2006] MISUSE OF THE ABSTENTION DOCTRINE 129
those actions involving one hundred or more named plaintiffs.' 76
Nevertheless, while mass actions may qualify as class actions under
CAFA, CAFA does not permit the aggregation of claims in mass ac-
tions.177 Instead, each of the named plaintiff's claims must exceed the
$75,000 amount in controversy requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).178
CAFA fails to specifically address which party has the burden of
proving that the jurisdictional requirements have been satisfied.179
Courts are split as to whether the burden remains with the removing
party or whether the burden shifts to the party seeking remand.180
Courts placing the burden on the party seeking remand have ob-
served that "[in cases of statutory construction, the Court's task is to
'interpret the words of the statute in light of the purposes Congress
sought to serve.'"118 These courts have turned to CAFA's legislative
history and found that its purpose was "to expand substantially fed-
eral court jurisdiction over class actions," and thus, "[i]ts provisions
should be read broadly, with a strong preference that interstate class
176. A case will not be deemed a "mass action" when: (1) all of the actionable events oc-
curred in the state where the action was filed, and injuries occurred in the forum state or in
contiguous states; (2) "the claims [were] joined upon motion of a defendant"; (3) all of the
claims are asserted solely on behalf of the general public under state law; or (4) "the claims have
been consolidated or coordinated solely for pretrial proceedings." Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Ongstad v. Piper Jaffray & Co., 407 F. Supp. 2d 1085, 1088 (D.N.D. 2006); Yeroushalmi v.
Blockbuster, Inc., No. CV 05-225-AHM(RCX), 2005 WL 2083008, at *2 (C.D. Cal. July 11,
2005); Berry v. Am. Express Publ'g, Corp., 381 F. Supp. 2d 1118, 1122 (C.D. Cal. 2005).
180. Compare Harvey v. Blockbuster, Inc., 384 F. Supp. 2d 749, 752 (D.N.J. 2005), and Waitt
v. Merck & Co., No. C05-0759L, 2005 WL 1799740, at *2 (W.D. Wash. July 27, 2005), and In re
Textainer P'ship Sec. Litig., No. C 05-0969 MMC, 2005 WL 1791559, at *3 (N.D. Cal. July 27,
2005), and Yeroushalmi, 2005 WL 2083008, at *3, and Berry, 381 F. Supp. 2d at 1122-23, with
Brill v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 427 F.3d 446, 448 (7th Cir. 2005), and Werner v. KPMG
L.L.P., 415 F. Supp. 2d 688, 695 (S.D. Tex. 2006), and Ongstad, 407 F. Supp. 2d at 1090-91, and
Plummer v. Farmers Group, Inc., 388 F. Supp. 2d 1310, 1317-18 (E.D. Okla. 2005), and Schwartz
v. Comcast Corp., No. Civ.A 05-2340, 2005 WL 1799414, at *4 (E.D. Pa. July 28, 2005), and
Sneddon v. Hotwire, Inc., No. C 05-0951 SI, C 05-0952 SI, C 05-0953 SI, 2005 WL 1593593, at *1
(N.D. Cal. June 29, 2005), and In re Expedia Hotel Taxes & Fees Litig., 377 F. Supp. 2d 904, 905
(W.D. Wash. 2005).
181. Waitt, 2005 WL 1799740, at *1 (quoting Norfolk Redevelopment & Hous. Auth. v. Chesa-
peake & Potomac Tel. Co. of Va., 464 U.S. 30, 36 (1983)). The court in Berry also turned to the
legislative history:
First, a statute cannot address all possible outcomes and situations, and language inevi-
tably contains some imprecision; where the text does not provide a clear answer, a
faithful interpretation of the statute necessarily involves more than the text itself. Sec-
ond, if legislative intent is clearly expressed in Committee Reports and other materials,
judicial disregard for the explicit and uncontradicted statements contained therein may
result in an interpretation that is wholly inconsistent with the statute that the legislature
envisioned.
381 F. Supp. 2d at 1122.
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actions should be heard in a federal court if properly removed by any
defendant. ' 182 These courts believe that although the statute is itself
silent on the issue of the burden of proof, Congress's intent is clear-
CAFA is "to be interpreted expansively. ' 183 This belief is consistent
with a Senate Judiciary Committee report generated during the pas-
sage of CAFA, which provides that "[i]f a purported class action is
removed pursuant to these jurisdictional provisions, the named plain-
tiff(s) should bear the burden of demonstrating that the removal was
improvident (i.e., that the applicable jurisdictional requirements are
not satisfied)."' 8 4 In accordance with this legislative history, these
courts have held that it is the plaintiff's responsibility to demonstrate
that removal from state court was improvident.18 5
In contrast, those courts that place the burden of proving jurisdic-
tion on the party seeking removal have observed that legislative his-
tory is used to assist in the interpretation of a statute only where the
language is ambiguous. 18 6 They argue that CAFA is not ambiguous
but simply silent on this issue. 187 The absence of a burden of proof
standard in CAFA does not create an ambiguity, because Congress is
presumed to know the settled law on the burden of proof. Congress
specifically discussed the issue in the Committee Report, so its failure
to address this issue suggests that it did not intend "to change the
settled case law on that issue. 188 Otherwise, Congress would have
explicitly changed the Act's language. 189 Therefore, since there is no
explicit language in CAFA that shifts the burden to the party seeking
remand, these courts have held that the burden remains with the re-
moving party.1 90
182. Waitt, 2005 WL 1799740, at *1 (quoting S. REP. No. 109-14, at 43 (2005), as reprinted in
2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 41); accord Yeroushalmi, 2005 WL 2083008, at *3.
183. Waitt, 2005 WL 1799740, at *2; accord Berry, 381 F. Supp. 2d at 1122.
184. S. REP. No. 109-14, at 42, as reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 40.
185. See, e.g., Natale v. Pfizer, Inc., 379 F. Supp. 2d 161, 168 (D. Mass. 2005); Waitt, 2005 WL
1799740, at *2; In re Textainer, 2005 WL 1791559, at *3; Yeroushalni, 2005 WL 2083008, at *3;
Berry, 381 F. Supp. 2d at 1122-23.
186. Brill v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 427 F.3d 446, 448 (7th Cir. 2005); Ongstad v.
Piper Jaffray & Co., 407 F. Supp. 2d 1085, 1089 (D.N.D. 2006); Judy v. Pfizer, Inc., No.
4:05CV1208RWS, 2005 WL 2240088, at *2 (E.D. Mo. Sept. 14, 2005); Schwartz v. Comcast Corp.,
No. Civ.A 05-240, 2005 WL 1799414, at *6 (E.D. Pa. July 28, 2005).
187. Brill, 427 F.3d at 448; Ongstad, 407 F. Supp. 2d at 1089; Judy, 2005 WL 2240088, at *2;
Schwartz, 2005 WL 1799414, at *6.
188. Ongstad, 407 F. Supp. 2d at 1089; accord Werner v. KPMG L.L.P., 415 F. Supp. 2d 688,
695 (S.D. Tex. 2006); Judy, 2005 WL 2240088, at *2; Schwartz, 2005 WL 1799414, at *7.
189. Brill, 427 F.3d at 448; Ongstad, 407 F. Supp. 2d at 1089; Plummer v. Farmers Group, Inc.,
388 F. Supp. 2d 1310, 1317 (E.D. Okla. 2005); Judy, 2005 WL 2240088, at *2; Schwartz, 2005 WL
1799414, at *7.
190. Brill, 427 F.3d at 448; Werner, 415 F. Supp. 2d at 695; Ongstad, 407 F. Supp. 2d at
1089-90; Judy, 2005 WL 2240088, at *2; Schwartz, 2005 WL 1799414, at *7.
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6. Manipulating Time Requirements to Defeat Removal
A defendant has thirty days from the date of formal service to file a
notice of removal. In Murphy Brothers, Inc. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing,
Inc.,191 the Supreme Court resolved the split in the lower federal
courts as to whether receipt of a courtesy copy of a complaint alone
(the "receipt rule") or formal service upon a defendant commenced
the thirty-day period. 92 The court struck down the receipt rule and
held that only formal service triggered the removal clock. 193
However, the question of when the thirty-day clock is triggered af-
ter the amendment of the original complaint remains unclear. If the
original complaint was removable, a subsequent amendment will not
revive the thirty-day time period for removal. 194 But where an
amendment creates a removal claim, the majority view starts the clock
at the moment the state court grants the permission to amend.195
Judge Posner, in Sullivan v. Conway, 96 articulated the majority view:
Until the state judge granted the motion to amend, there was no
basis for removal. Until then, the complaint did not state a federal
claim. It might never state a claim, since the state judge might deny
the motion .... When the motion was granted, the case first became
removable .... It would be fantastic to suppose that the time for
removing a case could run before the case became removable
197
Judge Posner determined that "[t]he statutory language that we
quoted speaks of a motion or other paper that discloses that the case
is or has become removable, not that it may sometime in the future
become removable if something happens, in this case the granting of a
motion by the state judge."1 98
191. 526 U.S. 344 (1999).
192. See generally D. Troy Blair, Recent Decision, Receipt of a Complaint, Prior to or Unat-
tended by Formal Service of Process, Does Not Trigger a Defendant's Thirty-Day Period to Re-
move a Case: Murphy Brothers, Inc. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc., 38 DuQ. L. REV. 663
(2000).
193. Murphy Bros., 526 U.S. at 351-53.
194. See, e.g., Wilson v. Intercollegiate (Big Ten) Conference Athletic Ass'n, 668 F.2d 962, 966
(7th Cir. 1982) (holding that the thirty-day time period was not revived when the plaintiff added
new federal claims because the original complaint alleged constitutional violations).
195. See, e.g., Graphic Scanning Corp. v. Yampol, 677 F. Supp. 256, 258 (D. Del. 1988). In
Yampol, the court explained why the clock starts when the motion to amend is granted:
The state court, by adjudicating the motion in the plaintiff's favor, alters the character
of the plaintiff's action from a purely state-based cause of action to one involving a
federal basis of jurisdiction. It is only at the time of the state court's ruling that a party
becomes certain of the removability of the case.
Id.
196. 157 F.3d 1092 (7th Cir. 1998).
197. Id. at 1094.
198. Id.
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A significant minority finds that the statute's plain language sup-
ports the idea that the filing of the motion to amend triggers the
thirty-day clock. 199 The minority position, therefore, treats a motion
to amend, whether granted or pending, as tantamount to an actual
amendment. This view "encourage[s] defendants to seek removal
before the filing of an amended complaint to avoid forfeiting their
right to remove even though such a complaint might never be
filed. 200
In most jurisdictions, if the first-served defendant does not remove
in a timely fashion, that defendant waives the right to removal and
cannot subsequently "consent to removal by a later-served defen-
dant. '20 1 Several courts have rejected this "first-served defendant"
rule as unfair.20 2 For example, the court in Eltman v. Pioneer Com-
munications of America, Inc.20 3 held that "[t]he policies behind the
thirty-day requirement simply do not justify implication of a strict,
mandatory first-served defendant rule into section 1446(b)." 20 4
Section 1446(b) has a bright-line cutoff that precludes removal in
diversity cases more than one year after commencement of the ac-
tion.20 5 Some courts apply the strict one-year cutoff only to cases that
199. See Harriman v. Liberian Mar. Corp., 204 F. Supp. 205, 206-07 (D. Mass. 1962). The
court in Harriman explained the minority view:
Congress did not condition the running of the twenty [now thirty] day period upon
receipt by defendant of knowledge that a motion had been allowed but, rather, on the
receipt by defendant of a document which would bring home to that defendant the fact
that plaintiff had changed his claim ....
Id. Because a motion is an express statutory trigger, the minority asserts that the plain meaning
of the statute moots the majority's concern that the minority approach compels defendants to
remove prematurely. See, e.g., Webster v. Sunnyside Corp., 836 F. Supp. 629, 630-31 (S.D. Iowa
1993) ("But to accept [the majority's] reading of the statute is to ignore its clear language-
language that does not make the commencement of the thirty-day period conditional on the
motion being granted.").
200. Miller v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 527 F. Supp. 775, 777 (D. Kan. 1981).
201. Mitchell v. Ky.-Am. Water Co., 178 F.R.D. 140, 142 (E.D. Ky. 1997).
202. See, e.g., Cartwright v. Thomas Jefferson Univ. Hosp., 99 F. Supp. 2d 550, 553 (E.D. Pa.
2000); Bauer v. Transitional Sch. Dist. of St. Louis, 88 F. Supp. 2d 999, 1002 (E.D. Mo. 2000);
White v. White, 32 F. Supp. 2d 890, 892-94 (W.D. La. 1998).
203. 151 F.R.D. 311 (N.D. 11. 1993).
204. Id. at 317; cf Higgins v. Ky. Fried Chicken, 953 F. Supp. 266, 270 (W.D. Wis. 1997)
(holding that the removal statutes are to be strictly construed, therefore, the later-served defen-
dant could not remove the action because his notice of removal was untimely).
205. But cf Brierly v. Alusuisse Flexible Packaging, Inc., 184 F.3d 527 (6th Cir. 1999) (remov-
ing defendant was not served until eighteen months after the action was commenced). The court
held that, based upon its review of the legislative history and statutory interpretation, the one-
year limitation on removal in diversity cases applied only to those cases that were initially re-
movable. Id. at 534-35. Because the unserved defendant in Brierly would have created diversity
if served, the case was initially removable and therefore fell outside the purview of § 1446(b). Id.
The Brierly court observed that "[i]f Congress had intended to place a one-year limitation on
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were not initially removable.20 6 The courts are split on whether the
one-year limitation is procedural or jurisdictional. If it is procedural,
it can be waived for equitable reasons. 207 If it is jurisdictional, it can-
not be waived.208
III. CHALLENGING REMOVAL THROUGH THE
ABSTENTION DOCTRINE
Federal courts sitting in equity have original power to abstain from
exercising jurisdiction.20 9 The abstention doctrine was judicially for-
mulated to maintain balance between state and federal sovereignty. 210
A case will not merit abstention unless there is some discernable state
interest or state law implicated in the proceeding.211 While the state
interest test has been substantially mitigated recently,212 it still re-
quires at least a superficial state interest to trigger abstention.
In the context of declaratory judgment actions, plaintiffs' attorneys
were initially unsuccessful in using the abstention doctrine to defeat
federal court removal.213 The principal impediment has been creating
a sustainable, parallel state court proceeding when an insurance com-
pany initially filed a declaratory judgment action in federal court.214
In those situations where plaintiffs initiate a state court declaratory
judgment action, diversity jurisdiction typically exists because the in-
removal of all diversity cases, it surely would have chosen less obscure and counter-intuitive
wording to accomplish that purpose." Id.
206. See, e.g., N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Deshotel, 142 F.3d 873, 886 (5th Cir. 1998).
207. See Kite v. Richard Wolf Med. Instruments Corp., 761 F. Supp. 597, 600 (S.D. Ind. 1989).
208. See Foiles ex rel Foiles v. Merrell Nat'l Labs., 730 F. Supp. 108, 109-10 (N.D. Ill. 1989).
209. Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 717 (1996) ("[I]t has long been estab-
lished that a federal court has the authority to decline to exercise its jurisdiction when it 'is asked
to employ its historic powers as a court of equity."' (quoting Fair Assessment in Real Estate
Ass'n v. McNary, 454 U.S. 100, 120 (1981) (Brennan, J., concurring))).
210. See generally 17A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H.
COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4241 (2d ed. 1988). Supporters of abstention
assert that it promotes a wiser balance of judicial federalism. See, e.g., Randall P. Bezanson,
Abstention: The Supreme Court and Allocation of Judicial Power, 27 VAND. L. REV. 1107, 1151
(1974); David L. Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 583-85 (1985).
Critics assert the superiority of federal courts over state courts as enforcers of federal rights.
See, e.g., Neuborne, supra note 7, at 1131 ("[T]he only judicial forums in our system capable of
enforcing countermajoritarian checks in a sustained, effective manner are the federal courts
211. See Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 611 (1975).
212. Ann Althouse, The Misguided Search for State Interest in Abstention Cases: Observations
on the Occasion of Pennzoil v. Texaco, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1051, 1083-90 (1988) (arguing that
Pennzoil eliminates the state interest test as a requirement for abstention).
213. See generally Kirkbride v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 933 F.2d 729, 734 (9th Cit. 1991); Piekarski v.
Home Owners Sav. Bank, 743 F. Supp. 38, 42 (D.D.C. 1990); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Longwell, 735 F.
Supp. 1187, 1192 (S.D.N.Y 1990).
214. See, e.g., Longwell, 735 F. Supp. at 1192.
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surance company's place of incorporation and principal place of busi-
ness are not within the foreign state. Most state declaratory judgment
acts are not discretionary and require invocation of jurisdiction by the
state court.215 When the state court declaratory judgment action is
removed to federal court on the basis of diversity, the federal court
does not have discretion to remand the state court proceeding absent
a procedural defect in the removal itself.216
In those situations where the insurance company initiated a declara-
tory judgment action in federal court, plaintiffs attempted to defeat
the discretionary authority of the federal court to hear the declaratory
judgment action by creating a parallel state court proceeding and ar-
guing for federal abstention in favor of a state court resolution.2 17 Ini-
tially, this procedural maneuver was unsuccessful because the
insurance company would simply remove the state court proceeding
under diversity principles. 218 However, recent federal court decisions
have given the use of parallel state court proceedings new vitality as a
method of defeating removal by invoking federal abstention.219
A. An Overview of the Federal Abstention Doctrine
1. Understanding Abstention
There are many variations of the abstention doctrine that overlap to
differing degrees.220 The principal approaches include the Railroad
Commission of Texas v. Pullman,2 21 Burford v. Sun Oil Co.,222 and
Younger v. Harris223 approaches.
Under Pullman abstention, "when a federal constitutional claim is
premised on an unsettled question of state law, the federal court
should stay its hand in order to provide the state courts an opportu-
nity to settle the underlying state-law question and thus avoid the pos-
215. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-1832 (2003).
216. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (2000).
217. See, e.g., Longwell, 735 F. Supp. at 1192.
218. See, e.g., id.
219. See, e.g., Sherwin-Williams Co. v. Holmes County, 343 F.3d 383, 394 (5th Cir. 2003); Huth
v. Hartford Ins. Co. of the Midwest, 298 F.3d 800, 802-03 (9th Cir. 2002); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co.
v. Ind-Corn Elec. Co., 139 F.3d 419, 423 (4th Cir. 1998) (per curiam).
220. See Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco Inc., 481 U.S. 1. 11 n.9 (1987) ("The various types of absten-
tion are not rigid pigeonholes into which federal courts must try to fit cases. Rather, they reflect
a complex of considerations designed to soften the tensions inherent in a system that contem-
plates parallel judicial processes.").
221. 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
222. 319 U.S. 315 (1943).
223. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
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sibility of unnecessarily deciding a constitutional question. '224 Later,
in Moore v. Sims, 22 5 the Court declared "that a federal action should
be stayed pending determination in state court of state-law issues cen-
tral to the constitutional dispute. '226 Finally, in Ohio Bureau of Em-
ployment Services v. Hodory,227 the Court remarked that "Pullman
abstention[] involves an inquiry focused on the possibility that the
state courts may interpret a challenged state statute so as to eliminate,
or at least to alter materially, the constitutional question
presented. ,228
The Burford abstention doctrine has its origin in the equitable pow-
ers of the court.2 29 Lower federal courts have disagreed on the propri-
ety of abstention in cases involving legal rather than equitable
claims.230 Burford abstention considers the independence of state
governments in carrying out domestic policy, and seeks to avoid con-
flict between state and federal courts.231 Burford abstention is not
based on a need to defer to a concurrent state court proceeding.
224. Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 285 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting) (alteration omitted) (quoting
Harris County Comm'rs Court v. Moore, 420 U.S. 77, 83 (1975)).
225. 442 U.S. 415 (1979).
226. Id. at 427-28.
227. 431 U.S. 471 (1977).
228. Id. at 477. See generally Boehning v. Ind. State Employees Ass'n, 423 U.S. 6 (1975) (per
curiam); Askew v. Hargrave, 401 U.S. 476 (1971) (per curiam); Reetz v. Bozanich, 397 U.S. 82
(1970); Aldrich v. Aldrich, 378 U.S. 540 (1964) (per curiam); Dresner v. City of Tallahassee, 378
U.S. 539 (1964) (per curiam); Clay v. Sun Ins. Office Ltd., 363 U.S. 207 (1960); City of Meridian
v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 358 U.S. 639 (1959) (per curiam); Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. Mc-
Laughlin, 323 U.S. 101 (1944).
229. Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 727-28 (1996).
230. Compare Tribune Co. v. Abiloa, 66 F.3d 12, 16 (2d Cir. 1995) ("Burford abstention is
generally appropriate only in cases where equitable relief is sought."), and Garamendi v. All-
state Ins. Co., 47 F.3d 350, 356 (9th Cir. 1995) ("[A] district court may not abstain under Burford
when the plaintiff seeks only legal relief."), and Riley v. Simmons, 45 F.3d 764, 777 (3d Cir. 1995)
(Nygaard, J., concurring) ("Burford abstention is simply not available when legal, rather than
equitable or declaratory, relief is sought."), and Fragoso v. Lopez, 991 F.2d 878, 882 (1st Cir.
1993) (abstention is improper in cases asserting only inequitable claims), and Univ. of Md. at
Bait. v. Peat Marwick Main & Co., 923 F.2d 265, 271 (3d Cir. 1991) ("Burford abstention applies
to 'a federal court sitting in equity."' (quoting New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New
Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 361 (1989))), with Riley, 45 F.3d at 772 n.7 (expressing doubt that the
restriction against applying Burford abstention in nonequitable suits is still good law), and Gen.
Glass Indus. Corp. v. Monsour Med. Found., 973 F.2d 197, 202 (3d Cir. 1992) ("Decisional au-
thority remains inconclusive as to whether Burford abstention may be ordered only in cases of
an inequitable nature .... "), and Taffet v. S. Co. 930 F.2d 847, 853 n.4 (11th Cir. 1991) ("Though
abstention rulings premised upon principles of comity and federalism were originally developed
in the context of actions seeking equitable relief, those principles have also been applied to
actions seeking monetary damages."), and Lac D'Amiante du Quebec, Ltee v. Am. Home As-
surance Co., 864 F.2d 1033, 1044 (3d Cir. 1988) ("If the relief sought is legal and the disruption is
of the extent and character suggesting that Burford abstention is appropriate, a refusal to abstain
simply because the federal court is not sitting as a court of equity makes no sense.").
231. Quackenbush, 517 U.S. at 726-28.
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Rather, Burford counsels that a district court should abstain from
hearing a case if the case involves a different question of state law or if
it implicates a state regulatory scheme, regardless of the presence of
an ongoing state proceeding.2 32
Under Younger abstention, "a federal court should not enjoin a
state criminal prosecution begun prior to the institution of the federal
suit except in very unusual situations, where necessary to prevent im-
mediate irreparable injury. '' 233 Although the Younger doctrine has
equitable origins, the Supreme Court has, in large part, abandoned the
equitable foundation in subsequent cases. 234 Numerous lower courts
have characterized Younger as a case based on comity and federalism
as opposed to equity.235
Many commentators argue that the Court is moving towards merg-
ing the various abstention doctrines.2 36 Indeed, in Colorado River
Water Conservation District v. United States,237 the Court tied the
three principal abstention variations together under the broader cate-
gory of "exceptional circumstances. ' 238  The Court found that there
are exceptional circumstances relating to "[w]ise judicial administra-
tion, giving regard to conservation of judicial resources and compre-
hensive disposition of litigation, 2 39 and that these exceptional
circumstances should be weighed against the duty to exercise federal
232. New Orleans Pub. Serv., 491 U.S. at 360-61.
233. Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66, 69 (1971); accord Colo. River Water Conservation Dist.
v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 816 (1976) (observing that "abstention is appropriate where,
absent bad faith, harassment, or a patently invalid state statute, federal jurisdiction has been
invoked for the purpose of restraining state criminal proceedings").
234. See George D. Brown, When Federalism and Separation of Powers Collide-Rethinking
Younger Abstention, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 114, 120 n.56 (1990) ("The post-Younger decisions
have moved away from the equity rationale."); Howard B. Stravitz, Younger Abstention Reaches
a Civil Maturity: Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco Inc., 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 997, 1007 (1989) ("Younger's
progeny toppled the equity pillar and reinforced the federalism pillar."); Larry W. Yackle, Ex-
plaining Habeas Corpus, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 991, 1042 (1985) (arguing that the Supreme Court
has eroded the equitable foundation of the doctrine).
235. See, e.g., Warmus v. Melahn, 62 F.3d 252. 255 (8th Cir. 1995), vacated by 517 U.S. 1241
(1996) (Younger abstention has its roots in comity and federalism); Schilling v. White, 58 F.3d
1081, 1084 n.3 (6th Cir. 1995) (Younger doctrine is founded in federalism and comity); Gwynedd
Props. v. Lower Gwynedd Twp., 970 F.2d 1195, 1199-2000 (3d Cir. 1992) (same).
236. See Georgene M. Vairo, Making Younger Civil: The Consequences of Federal Court Def-
erence to State Court Proceedings, 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 173, 212 (1989) (similarities between
various abstention doctrines outweigh differences and therefore one test for abstention should
be adopted). See generally Stephen Jon Moss, Comment, Pennzoil: A Merger of Federal Absten-
tion, 13 OKLA. Crry U. L. REV. 607 (1988) (Pennzoil effectively merged Pullman and Younger
abstention doctrines).
237. 424 U.S. 800 (1976).
238. Id. at 814-17.
239. Id. at 817 (alteration in original) (quoting Kerotest Mfg. Co. v. C-O-Two Fire Equip. Co.,
342 U.S. 180, 183 (1952)).
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jurisdiction. 240  But even if a case does not fall within the Pullman,
Burford, or Younger categories of exceptional circumstances, other
principles may give rise to the application of abstention. 241
240. Id. A plurality of the Court in Will v. Calvert Fire Insurance Co., 437 U.S. 655, 665-67
(1978) contradicted the Colorado River "exceptional circumstances" doctrine. Writing for the
plurality, Justice Rehnquist observed that the district court had discretion to accept concurrent
jurisdiction of a state court matter. Id. at 664. Justice Rehnquist found that "[it is well estab-
lished that 'the pendency of an action in the state court is no bar to proceedings concerning the
same matter in the Federal court having jurisdiction."' Id. at 662 (quoting McClellan v. Carland,
217 U.S. 268, 282 (1910)). Justice Rehnquist noted that "[i]t is equally well settled that a district
court is 'under no compulsion to exercise that jurisdiction' where the controversy may be settled
more expeditiously in the state court." Id. at 662-63 (quoting Brillhart v. Excess Ins. Co., 316
U.S. 491, 494 (1942)). He emphasized that the "right to proceed with a duplicative action in a
federal court can never be said to be 'clear and indisputable."' Id. at 666 n.8. The plurality in
Calvert established the principle that any likelihood of duplicative litigation was sufficient to
justify abstention. Id. at 663-64. The reasoning of this plurality contradicted the "exceptional
circumstances" doctrine later espoused by the Court.
The conflicting holdings of Colorado River and Calvert were clarified in Moses H. Cone Me-
morial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 14-19 (1983). The Court in Moses
held that the "exceptional circumstances" test of Colorado River should be used by district
courts in determining whether to stay an action in favor of state court proceedings. Id. The
Moses Court formulated two additional factors for the "exceptional circumstances" test: (1) the
determination of which forum's substantive law would govern the merits of the litigation; and (2)
the adequacy of the state forum to protect the parties' rights. Id. at 23-27. The Moses Court
reaffirmed the doctrine "that the federal courts have a 'virtually unflagging obligation ... to
exercise the jurisdiction given them."' Id. at 15 (alteration in original) (quoting Colorado River,
424 U.S. at 817).
After Moses, the circuit courts were divided over which standard governed a district court's
decision to stay or dismiss a declaratory judgment action where there were parallel state pro-
ceedings. The Third Circuit, Fourth Circuit, Fifth Circuit, and Ninth Circuit applied the discre-
tionary standard articulated in Brillhart and Calvert. See, e.g., Terra Nova Ins. Co. v. 900 Bar,
Inc., 887 F.2d 1213, 1224 (3d Cit. 1989); Mitcheson v. Harris, 955 F.2d 235, 237-38 (4th Cir. 1992)
(the "exceptional circumstances" test of Colorado River and Moses is inapplicable in declaratory
judgment actions); Travelers Ins. Co. v. La. Farm Bureau Fed'n, Inc., 996 F.2d 774, 778 n.12 (5th
Cir. 1993) (same); Chamberlain v. Allstate Ins. Co., 931 F.2d 1361, 1366 (9th Cir. 1991) (explain-
ing that Colorado River test does not apply to declaratory relief actions because they have "spe-
cial status").
However, other circuit courts applied the narrow exceptional circumstances test developed in
Colorado River and expanded in Moses. See, e.g., Employers Ins. of Wausau v. Mo. Elec. Works,
Inc., 23 F.3d 1372, 1374 n.3 (8th Cir. 1994) (following Colorado River and Moses the district
court was not justified in staying or dismissing a declaratory relief action absent "exceptional
circumstances"); Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co. v. Conn. Bank & Trust Co., 806 F.2d 411, 413 (2d
Cir. 1986) (same). A middle ground between these two positions can be found. See, e.g., Fuller
Co. v. Ramon I. Gil, Inc., 782 F.2d 306, 308-11 (1st Cir. 1986) (where the state court has ex-
pended significant resources through the adjudicatory process of the state law claims, federal
courts may decline to exercise jurisdiction over a declaratory judgment action).
241. Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 817 ("Although this case falls within none of the abstention
categories, there are principles unrelated to considerations of proper constitutional adjudication
and regard for federal-state relations which govern in situations involving the contemporaneous
exercise of concurrent jurisdictions, either by federal courts or by state and federal courts.").
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2. Abstention and Federal Declaratory Judgment Actions
A separate line of cases addressing the abstention doctrine in rela-
tion to federal declaratory judgment actions has also developed. 242
Problems occur when a federal district court is asked to exercise juris-
diction under the FDJA while a parallel case is pending in state
court.243 Jurisdiction under the FDJA is discretionary and not com-
pulsory.2 44 The Act states that the district court "may declare the
rights and other legal relations of any interested party. '2 45 In these
situations, courts have generally found that the decision to exercise
their discretion and accept jurisdiction should be guided by the Su-
preme Court's Brillhart decision.
In Brillhart, an insurance company brought suit for declaratory re-
lief in federal court to determine its obligation in a pending state court
proceeding.246 The Court noted that "[o]rdinarily it would be un-
economical as well as vexatious for a federal court to proceed in a
declaratory judgment suit where another suit is pending in a state
court presenting the same issues, not governed by federal law, be-
tween the same parties. ' 247 In determining whether to abstain, the
Court indicated that district courts should assess whether the contro-
versy would be better resolved in state court. 248 This assessment re-
quires "inquiry into the scope of the pending state court proceeding
and the nature of defenses open there. ' 249 Further, "[t]he federal
court may have to consider whether the claims of all parties in interest
can satisfactorily be adjudicated in that proceeding, whether necessary
parties have been joined, whether such parties are amenable to pro-
cess in that proceeding, etc."'250
242. In Quackenbush, the Court found that the various forms of the abstention doctrine had
been extended to "certain classes of declaratory judgments, the granting of which is generally
committed to the courts' discretion." 517 U.S. 706, 718 (1996) (citations omitted). It is interest-
ing to note that in Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Huffman, 319 U.S. 293, 297 (1943), and
Samuels v. MacKell, 401 U.S. 66, 69-70 (1971), the Supreme Court recognized that the actions
were brought pursuant to the FDJA but did not apply the discretion under this statute, but
rather applied different forms of the abstention doctrine. See generally Lewis Yelin, Note, Bur-
ford Abstention in Actions for Damages, 99 CoLUM. L. REV. 1871 (1999) (discussing the effects
of Quackenbush on diversity jurisdiction).
243. Md. Cas. Co. v. Knight, 96 F.3d 1284, 1288 (9th Cir. 1996).
244. See Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277, 286-87 (1995); Gov't Employees Ins., Co. v.
Dizol, 133 F.3d 1220, 1223 (9th Cir. 1998).
245. 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (2000) (emphasis added).
246. Brillhart v. Excess Ins. Co. of Am., 316 U.S. 491, 492 (1942).
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In Wilton v. Seven Falls Co.,251 the Supreme Court established that
the Brillhart test-and not the Colorado River exceptional circum-
stances test-should govern a district court's exercise of discretion in a
federal declaratory judgment action brought during the pendency of
parallel state court proceedings.252 Thus, the Brillhart test was estab-
lished as a self-contained division of the abstention doctrine applica-
ble to the FDJA. 253
3. The Questions Left Open by Wilton
While Wilton set the standard for applying the abstention doctrine
where there was a pending parallel state action, it did not establish the
exact boundaries of discretion when there was no state court action. 254
Accordingly, Wilton left a void that has not been filled by subsequent
Supreme Court jurisprudence. Falling into this void are those cases
that have been removed from state to federal court pursuant to diver-
sity jurisdiction.
As a general rule, only limited circumstances will support remand
once a case is removed. Under the original version of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1447(c), only a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction or a defect in the
removal procedures allowed for remand. Therefore, courts have held
that "if jurisdiction exists and was properly invoked, the Court has no
discretion to remand. '2 5 However, the statutory language has since
changed, and the abstention doctrine has evolved along with it.
251. 515 U.S. 277 (1995).
252. Id. at 289-90. The Ninth Circuit has recognized that the Wilton decision was silent as to
the boundaries of discretion in this scenario, and also recognized the need for guidance on the
issue. See Budget Rent-A-Car v. Crawford, 108 F.3d 1075, 1080 (9th Cir. 1997). In Crawford,
the Ninth Circuit failed to set clear guidelines for asserting discretion in declaratory judgment
actions when there were no parallel state court cases pending. Instead, the Crawford court held
that a district court must first weigh whether existing state court remedies will provide adequate
remedies. Id. Crawford also held abstention could be justified if the declaratory judgment ac-
tion was filed in anticipation of the filing of a state court proceeding and in fact was a form of
forum shopping. Id. at 1080-81. However, Crawford was overruled one year later by Govern-
ment Employees Insurance Co. v. Dizol, 133 F.3d 1220, 1227 (9th Cir. 1998). With Crawford
overturned, the Ninth Circuit is once again left without guidance for the boundaries of discretion
in actions like those presented in Huth v. Hartford Insurance Co., 298 F.3d 800 (9th Cir. 2002).
253. Wilton, 515 U.S. at 289-90. The Brillhart test exists to support important issues of "judi-
cial economy, comity and federalism." Dizol, 133 F.3d at 1226. The Brillhart analysis focuses on
whether a state case involving the same parties would be able to also address the controversy in
the declaratory judgment action. See Wilton, 515 U.S. at 282-83. These questions imply the
existence of a separate state court action, which could also add a request for declaratory relief as
an additional claim, as opposed to the situation where the "state case" is identical to the federal
court action. Id.
254. Wilton, 515 U.S. at 290.
255. Burnette v. Godshall, 828 F. Supp. 1439, 1444 (N.D. Cal. 1993), aff'd sub nom. Burnette
v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., 72 F.3d 766 (9th Cir. 1995); accord Davis v. Joyner, 240 F.
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Prior to 1988, 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) provided that "[i]f at any time
before final judgment it appears that the case was removed improvi-
dently and without jurisdiction, the district court shall remand the
case, and may order the payment of just costs. '256 However, the stat-
ute was amended in 1988:
A motion to remand the case on the basis of any defect in removal
procedure must be made within 30 days after the filing of the notice
of removal under section 1446(a). If at any time before final judg-
ment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdic-
tion, the case shall be remanded. 257
As commentators have noted, the amendment allowed courts to rec-
ognize other bases for remand other than jurisdictional and procedu-
ral defects:
There was a special reason for the inclusion of the phrase "any
defect in removal procedure." In one sense it wasn't necessary; the
amendment could have been phrased merely to impose the 30-day
limit on all remand motions except one based on subject matter ju-
risdiction. There may be occasion to remand a case, however, on a
ground that constitutes neither a defect of subject matter jurisdic-
tion nor a defect in procedure. Congress cites here the special re-
mand problem that can arise in cases involving the case law
doctrines of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction.
... [T]he remand in the situation described need not be made
within the 30-day period prescribed in the new subdivision (c) of
§ 1447. While the dropping out of the claim on which the other
claims depended does not bring about a defect of subject matterjurisdiction-because the court has discretion to retain and try the
remaining claims and a defect in subject matter jurisdiction can
never allow that-neither is it to be deemed a mere defect of "pro-
cedure" that would trigger the 30-day rule.258
Supp. 689, 690 (E.D.N.C. 1964) (observing that "where Congress has provided both a state and a
federal forum, and has further provided for actions first brought in the state court to be removed
to the federal court, no discretionary power exists to remand the case to the state court" (quot-
ing Vann v. Jackson, 165 F. Supp. 377, 381 (E.D.N.C. 1958))).
256. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (1982).
257. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (1988).
258. David D. Siegel, Commentary on 1988 Revision of Section 1447, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1447 (1994
& Supp. 2006). Congress also commented on the issue:
Subsection (c) amends 28 U.S.C. 1447(c) and adds a new subsection (e). Section
1447(c) now appears to require remand to state court if at any time before final judg-
ment it appears that the removal was improvident. So long as the defect in removal
procedure does not involve a lack of federal subject matter jurisdiction, there is no
reason why either State or Federal courts, or the parties, should be subject to the bur-
dens of shuttling a case between two courts that each have subject matter jurisdiction.
There is also some risk that a party who is aware of a defect in removal procedure may
hold the defect in reserve as a means of forum shopping if the litigation should take an
unfavorable turn. The amendment provides a period of 30 days within which remand
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A further statutory amendment in 1996 solidified this viewpoint.
The 1996 amendment changed the basis of removal from "any defect
in removal procedure" to "any defect other than lack of subject mat-
ter jurisdiction. ' 259 By using the phrase "any defect other than lack of
subject matter jurisdiction," Congress implicitly recognized situations
that are neither procedural nor concerned with subject matter
jurisdiction.260
Prior to the 1988 and 1996 amendments, Supreme Court precedent,
as well as several circuit court decisions, required a strict construction
of 28 U.S.C. § 1447 that allowed for remand only where there was a
lack of subject-matter jurisdiction or a procedural defect. 261 Following
these amendments, however, courts recognized the possibility of non-
statutory justifications for remand. 262 More specifically, a significant
number of courts held that remand based on the abstention doctrine
was proper.2 63
Despite these changes, there was a judicial recognition that the use
of the abstention doctrine to remand cases that have been removed on
the basis of diversity should proceed cautiously.264 As the Second Cir-
cuit noted in Minot v. Eckardt-Minot, "[t]he possibility of prejudice to
out-of-state litigants, which provides whatever diminishing justifica-
tion for federal diversity jurisdiction remains, suggests that courts
must be sought on any ground other than lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The
amendment is written in terms of a defect in "removal procedure" in order to avoid any
implication that remand is unavailable after disposition of all federal questions leaves
only State law questions that might be decided as a matter of ancillary or pendent
jurisdiction or that instead might be remanded.
H.R. REP. No. 100-889, at 72 (1988), as reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5982, 6033.
259. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (Supp. 11 1996).
260. David D. Siegel, Commentary on 1996 Revision of Section 1447, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1447
(Supp. 2006). Siegel further discussed this point:
A statement in a House Report says that Congress was told that the intent was "not
entirely clear" from the "procedure" wording. So Congress was persuaded in 1996 to
amend the statute to resolve the ostensible ambiguity. It is Congress's hope, or in any
event that of Congress's advisors, that this will resolve the ambiguity. If it does, how-
ever, it may exact a price on other fronts. The "other than lack of subject matter juris-
diction" net is indeed a wide one, but like the tuna net that incidentally kills the
porpoise, this one would also appear to inflict some unintended casualties. At least on
its face, it's like a residuary clause that has the curious side effect of cancelling some
specific bequests.
Id. (citation omitted).
261. See, e.g., Stevo v. CSX Transp., Inc., 940 F. Supp. 1222, 1224 (N.D. I11. 1996) (collecting
cases).
262. Id. at 1224-25 (collecting cases).
263. Id. at 1225 (collecting cases); see also IMFC Prof. Servs. of Fla., Inc. v. Latin Am. Home
Health, Inc., 676 F.2d 152, 159-60 (5th Cir. 1982); Todd v. Richmond, 844 F. Supp. 1422, 1425 (D.
Kan. 1994).
264. Minot v. Eckardt-Minot, 13 F.3d 590, 593 (2d Cir. 1994).
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should be wary of using judicially-crafted abstention doctrines to deny
out-of-state litigants a federal forum that they prefer. '265
The Supreme Court initially placed limits on the use of abstention
as a means of remanding a properly removed state court action. In
Quackenbush v. Allstate Insurance Co., 266 the Supreme Court limited
the applicability of the abstention doctrine to cases brought in equity:
[I]n cases where the relief being sought is equitable in nature or
otherwise discretionary, federal courts not only have the power to
stay the action based on abstention principles, but can also, in other-
wise appropriate circumstances, decline to exercise jurisdiction alto-
gether by either dismissing the suit or remanding it to state court.
By contrast, while [the Court has] held that federal courts may stay
actions for damages based on abstention principles, [the Court has]
not held that those principles support the outright dismissal or re-
mand of damages actions. 267
In other words, the Court supported abstention to remand an other-
wise properly removed action to state court only where the subject
action arose in equity or was otherwise discretionary.268
Initially, courts appeared in favor of limiting the application of the
abstention doctrine in remand situations. For example, in Allstate In-
surance Co. v. Longwell,269 an insurance company filed a declaratory
judgment action against its insured in federal court.270 The insured
responded by filing a declaratory judgment action in state court.27'
The insurer subsequently removed the state action to federal court
based on diversity jurisdiction and the insured moved to remand a
portion of the case back to state court. 272
The Longwell court rejected the argument that the Burford absten-
tion doctrine applied because the declaratory judgment action in-
volved only contract law and did not interfere with specialized
265. Id. (citing La. Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 31-44 (1959) (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting); Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 336-48 (1943) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting)).
266. 517 U.S. 706 (1996).
267. Id. at 721.
268. Webb v. B.C. Rogers Poultry, Inc., 174 F.3d 697, 701 (5th Cir. 1999); see also Miller
Brewing Co. v. ACE U.S. Holdings, Inc., 391 F. Supp. 2d 735, 741 (E.D. Wis. 2005) ("[I]n the
Seventh Circuit, a district court may not remand or dismiss a properly removed case based on an
abstention doctrine."); Koken v. Viad Corp., 307 F. Supp. 2d 650, 653-54 (E.D. Pa. 2004)
("[W]hen the remedy sought is legal rather than equitable, a district court may not abstain under
Burford and remand the complaint to state court. When the relief sought is equitable in nature,
however, abstention principles allow a federal court to stay the action, dismiss the suit, or re-
mand .... ").
269. 735 F. Supp. 1187 (S.D.N.Y 1990).
270. Id. at 1189.
271. Id. at 1189-90.
272. Id.
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ongoing state regulatory schemes.2 73  More significantly, the court
held that the Colorado River abstention doctrine did not apply under
those circumstances.2 7 4 The court stated that the doctrine given in
Colorado River is "predicated on the existence of pending state litiga-
tion on parallel issues, and, thus, [is] inapposite since there is no
longer anything pending in the state courts-both lawsuits are now
here." 2
75
Subsequently, the Second Circuit and Ninth Circuit followed this
cautious approach. The Second Circuit in Piekarski v. Home Owners
Savings Bank2 76 found that the abstention doctrine was inapplicable
because there was only "one case, which originally was in state court,
but now has been properly removed to federal court. ' 277 In the Ninth
Circuit case, Kirkbride v. Continental Casualty Co.,2 78 the state case
had been removed in its entirety to federal court.2 79 The district court
remanded the declaratory judgment action to state court based on the
abstention doctrine.2 80 The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's
decision.28 1 The court held that "Itihe [abstention] doctrine is 'availa-
ble only in situations involving the contemporaneous exercise of con-
current jurisdictions, either by the federal courts or by state and
federal courts.' 2 82 The court continued that the abstention doctrine
was not applicable because the case had been removed to federal
court in its entirety and thus "there was no concurrent or pending
state court proceeding when the appellees moved for remand. 283
Despite these initial decisions limiting the application of the absten-
tion doctrine, the Brillhart abstention variation has provided courts
273. Id. at 1191.
274. Id. at 1191-92.
275. Longwell, 735 F. Supp. at 1192.
276. 743 F. Supp. 38 (D.D.C. 1990).
277. Id. at 42; accord Dittmer v. County of Suffolk, 146 F.3d 113, 117-18 (2d Cir. 1998) (recog-
nizing that abstention could be applied only where there was the contemporaneous exercise of
concurrent jurisdiction, which would not include where a case had been removed to federal
court).
278. 933 F.2d 729 (9th Cir. 1991).
279. Id. at 730.
280. Id. at 734.
281. Id. at 730.
282. Id. at 734 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Nichols,
885 F.2d 633, 638 (9th Cir. 1989)).
283. Id.; accord Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers Local 1357 v. Am. Int'l Adjustment Co., 955 F.
Supp. 1218, 1220 n.1 (D. Haw. 1997) (observing that there was no pending state action where the
state action had been properly removed). Both the Tenth Circuit and Eleventh Circuit have
similarly stated that dismissing a declaratory judgment action where there is no pending parallel
state proceeding is an abuse of discretion. See Fed. Reserve Bank of Atlanta v. Thomas, 220




with another opportunity to speak on this issue. As previously dis-
cussed, the Supreme Court decisions in Brillhart and Wilton provide a
broad power of abstention over federal declaratory judgment actions
where there are pending parallel state actions. These decisions, how-
ever, left a glaring void in relation to the proper and valid application
of the abstention doctrine when the parallel state action is no longer
pending because it has been removed. Some courts have attempted to
fill this void by significantly expanding the application of the Brilihart
variation of the abstention doctrine, in direct contrast to the previous
line of cases.
The Fourth Circuit started this trend in 1998. In Aetna Casualty &
Surety Co. v. Ind-Com Electric Co.,284 the court held that the existence
of a parallel state proceeding is not dispositive:
There is no requirement that a parallel proceeding be pending in
state court before a federal court should decline to exercise jurisdic-
tion over a declaratory judgment action. Rather, as the district
court stated, "[t]he existence or nonexistence of a state court action
is simply one consideration relevant to whether to grant declaratory
relief." To hold otherwise would in effect create a per se rule re-
quiring a district court to entertain a declaratory judgment action
when no state court proceeding is pending. Such a rule would be
inconsistent with our long-standing belief that district courts should
be afforded great latitude in determining whether to grant or deny
declaratory relief.285
In essence, this decision expanded the abstention doctrine to circum-
stances where there are no pending parallel state proceedings. 286
This reasoning was subsequently adopted by the Ninth Circuit in
Huth v. Hartford Insurance Co. of the Midwest,287 and applied to situa-
tions involving remand from federal court where there are no pending
parallel state proceedings. In the district court, Hartford Insurance
brought an action pursuant to the FDJA.288 Approximately one week
after Hartford filed the suit, Huth filed an identical action in Arizona
state court pursuant to the Declaratory Judgment Act. 289 Based on
the existence of diversity jurisdiction, Hartford subsequently removed
the state declaratory judgment action to the Arizona federal district
court, which consolidated the state and federal actions.290 Huth filed
284. 139 F.3d 419 (4th Cir. 1998).
285. Id. at 423 (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
286. See Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277, 286 (1995).
287. 298 F.3d 800 (9th Cir. 2002).
288. Id. at 802.
289. Id. Unlike the FDJA, Arizona's Declaratory Judgment Act is not discretionary. See
ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-1832 (2003).
290. Huth, 298 F.3d at 802.
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a motion with the district court to remand the state portion of the
consolidated action and simultaneously stay the federal portion of the
consolidated action. 291 Huth argued that the Brillhart and Wilton ab-
stention doctrines applied.292 The court agreed. Basing its decision
on the Brillhart standards, the district court granted both the motion
to remand and the motion to stay.2 93 It found that despite the fact
that the Arizona declaratory judgment action had been properly re-
moved to federal court, that action was still a "pending" state action
and could thus be remanded pursuant to the court's discretion under
the FDJA.2 94
Hartford appealed to the Ninth Circuit, asserting that the district
court had abused its discretion by remanding the state court action
and staying the federal court action.2 95 The Ninth Circuit affirmed
this decision, reasoning that the absence of a pending state action was,
according to Brilihart, simply one of the "balancing factors the district
court must weigh. '2 96 The Ninth Circuit thus sanctioned the lower
court's evasive maneuver of initially remanding the state court action
based upon the Brillhart abstention doctrine, and then abstaining
from hearing the federal action in deference to the "pending" state
action. 297 Thus, after Huth, when a party seeks to defeat removal, it
can simply create a parallel state court proceeding and then ask the
federal court to either stay its proceedings or dismiss them altogether.
The two Huth decisions are unique in that they deferred to parallel
state court proceedings that were created by federal decision. Both
Brillhart and Wilton addressed only situations in which a federal de-
claratory judgment action was brought at the same time a parallel
state proceeding was pending. 298 In Wilton, the Supreme Court con-
cluded its decision by stating "[w]e do not attempt at this time to de-
lineate the outer boundaries of [federal court] discretion in other
cases, for example, cases raising issues of federal law or cases in which





295. Id. at 803-04.
296. Huth, 298 F.3d at 803.
297. Id. at 800.
298. See generally Brillhart v. Excess Ins. Co. of Am., 316 U.S. 491 (1942); Wilton v. Seven
Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277 (1995).
299. Wilton, 515 U.S. at 290 (emphasis added).
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The Fifth Circuit has since agreed with the reasoning of the Ninth
Circuit in Huth. In Sherwin-Williams Co. v. Holmes County,30 0 the
court held that "[t]he lack of a pending parallel state proceeding
should not automatically require a district court to decide a declara-
tory judgment action, just as the presence of a related state proceed-
ing does not automatically require a district court to dismiss a federal
declaratory judgment action. '30 1 The Fifth Circuit, like the Fourth
Circuit and Ninth Circuit, concluded that the existence of a pending
parallel state court proceeding was only one factor in the overall ab-
stention analysis.302 It was, however, an important factor. Specifi-
cally, the court observed that "[t]he absence of any pending related
state litigation strengthens the argument against dismissal of the fed-
eral declaratory judgment action.... [A]lthough the lack of a pending
parallel state proceeding [does] not require the district judge to hear
the declaratory judgment action, it is a factor that weighs strongly
against dismissal. '303
The Supreme Court also expressly left open the question of the
proper application of abstention to declaratory judgment actions
when a federal question exists.304 The lower courts have addressed
this issue on only a few occasions. In Youell v. Exxon Corp.,305 the
Second Circuit considered a district court's dismissal of a declaratory
judgment action that had been brought after the related state court
suit. It reversed the lower court's dismissal of the declaratory judg-
ment action on the ground that the issue presented in the declaratory
judgment action was a "novel issue of federal admiralty law" which
should have been heard in federal court, at least under the Brillhart
factors.306
The Eighth Circuit and the Fifth Circuit have subsequently agreed
with Youell. In Verizon Communications, Inc. v. Inverizon Interna-
tional, Inc.,307 the Eighth Circuit held that it was an abuse of discre-
tion for the district court to refuse to hear a case involving both state
and federal questions. 308 In so holding, the Eighth Circuit observed
that while the lower court properly considered the factors in Wilton
and Brillhart, the court "failed to mention one very significant factor
300. 343 F.3d 383 (5th Cir. 2003).
301. Id. at 394.
302. Id.
303. Id. (emphasis added).
304. Wilton, 515 U.S. at 290.
305. 74 F.3d 373 (2d Cir. 1996).
306. Id. at 376 (quoting Youell v. Exxon Corp., 48 F.3d 105, 114 (2d Cir. 1995)).
307. 295 F.3d 870 (8th Cir. 2002).
308. Id. at 875.
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present in this case that simply was not at issue in either Brillhart or
Wilton-that is, the presence of a federal question that is not present
in the state court action. '309
Likewise, in Sherwin-Williams, the Fifth Circuit observed that
"[n]either Brilihart nor Wilton decided whether the presence of a fed-
eral question in a declaratory judgment action limited a district court's
discretion to decide or dismiss the action. '310 While it agreed that the
presence of a federal question was an important factor to consider
when determining whether to exercise discretion, the Fifth Circuit dis-
cussed how this factor should be evaluated:
The presence of federal law questions, their relationship to state law
questions, the ability of the federal court to resolve state law issues,
and the ability of a state court to resolve the federal law issues are
important to deciding whether a state or federal court should be the
one to decide the issues raised in the federal court declaratory judg-
ment action .... The presence of federal law issues is especially
important when there is no pending state court proceeding to which
the federal district court can defer. If the federal law issue is impor-
tant to the case, even if state law questions are also present and
important to the outcome, and no state court case is pending, that
weighs in favor of the federal court exercising its discretion to de-
cide the declaratory judgment action.311
In Sherwin-Williams, the Fifth Circuit observed that there were both
state and federal issues involved-none of which were novel. 312
While the federal issues could have been resolved in state court, there
were no pending state court cases at the time the federal court dis-
missed the declaratory judgement action.313 Due to the existence of
the federal questions and the lack of a pending parallel state court
action, the court held that the dismissal of the declaratory judgment
action by the lower court was inappropriate. 314
None of these cases involved the remand of a properly removed
action involving a federal question. However, these cases provide
some insight as to where courts may be headed on this issue. Specifi-
cally, it appears that the presence of a federal question, like the pres-
ence of a pending parallel state proceeding, is simply one factor in the
abstention analysis. While it is obviously an important factor, it may
no longer be determinative.
309. Id. at 873.
310. 343 F.3d 383, 395 (5th Cir. 2003).
311. Id. at 396.
312. Id. at 396-97.
313. Id. at 397.
314. Id.
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B. Analysis of Abstention as a Procedural Challenge to Removal
In New Orleans Public Service, Inc. v. Council of New Orleans,315
the Supreme Court noted, "Congress, and not the Judiciary, defines
the scope of federal jurisdiction within the constitutionally permissible
bounds. ' 316 Where federal jurisdictional requirements have been met,
an exercise of judicial discretion to abstain constitutes a judicial usur-
pation of legislative power. 317 For American constitutional democracy
to function properly, the courts must act within their congressionally-
conferred jurisdictional province. 318 However, invocation of jurisdic-
315. 491 U.S. 350 (1989).
316. Id. at 359 (citing Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 226, 234 (1922)).
317. One leading commentator has articulated the view that abstention is antithetical to the
doctrine of separation of powers:
If Congress intended that the federal courts exercise a particular jurisdiction, either to
achieve substantive legislative ends or to provide a constitutionally-contemplated juris-
dictional advantage, a court may not, absent constitutional objections, repeal those ju-
risdictional grants. But one may question why, if the courts do not possess the
institutional authority to repeal the legislature's jurisdictional scheme, they possess any
greater authority to modify the scheme in a manner not contemplated by the legislative
body. In either repealing or modifying the legislation, the court would be altering a
legislative scheme because of disagreement with the social policy choices that the
scheme manifests. Thus, if a judge-made form of partial abstention is inconsistent with
congressional intent to leave federal court jurisdiction unlimited, the fact that the ab-
stention leaves intact a portion of the jurisdictional grant will not insulate it from a
separation-of-powers attack.
The foundation of the separation-of-powers critique is the assumption that judge-
made partial abstention conflicts with congressional goals embodied in the seemingly
unlimited grants of jurisdiction. It is the validity of this assumption that arguably sepa-
rates the total and partial abstention models as departures from separation-of-powers
principles. Various models of implied congressional authorization may be employed to
justify partial abstention, but they are incapable of supporting total abstention. While
it is at least conceivable that Congress would implicitly delegate to the judiciary the
authority to modify or limit a substantive statutory right or a jurisdictional grant, it is
absurd to imagine that Congress would implicitly grant the courts authority effectively
to repeal such legislation. The exercise of such authority would render pointless the
entire legislative process.
Martin H. Redish, Abstention, Separation of Powers, and the Limits of the Judicial Function, 94
YALE L.J. 71, 77-78 (1984) (citations omitted). Some commentators have argued for the expan-
sion of federal judicial power for two principal reasons: (1) fear of perceived local prejudices,
and (2) fear that a local forum will ignore or disregard federal law. See Paul M. Bator, The State
Courts and Federal Constitutional Litigation, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 605, 607 (1981) (federal
courts are the preferred forum for determination and analysis of constitutional principles);
David A. Sonenshein, Abstention: The Crooked Course of Colorado River, 59 TUL. L. REV. 651,
651 (1985) (because federal judges have life tenure, they are "less subject to the vagaries and
pressures of local public opinion").
318. In Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, the Court reiterated the importance of the separa-
tion of powers:
Our system of government is, after all, a tripartite one, with each branch having certain
defined functions delegated to it by the Constitution. While "[iut is emphatically the
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is" it is equally-and
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tion by the federal courts has proved to be an elastic practice that has
expanded and contracted unpredictably.
Common law requires that courts exercise the jurisdiction that they
possess. 319 Chief Justice Marshall declared that judicial conduct con-
trary to this principle would be in direct defiance of the prerogatives
set forth in the Constitution. Marshall opined, "[w]e have no more
right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to
usurp that which is not given. The one or the other would be treason
to the constitution. '320 Most federal judges today would not consider
emphatically-the exclusive province of the Congress not only to formulate legislative
policies and mandate programs and projects, but also to establish their relative priority
for the Nation. Once Congress, exercising its delegated powers, has decided the order
of priorities in a given area, it is for the Executive to administer the laws and for the
courts to enforce them when enforcement is sought.
437 U.S. 153, 194 (1978) (alteration in original) (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 1 (Cranch)
137, 177 (1803)); accord California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287, 297-98 (1981); Touche Ross &
Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 575-76 (1979).
319. Ohio v. Wyandotte Chems. Corp., 401 U.S. 493,496-97 (1971) (citing Cohens v. Virginia,
19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821)); see also McClellan v. Carland, 217 U.S. 268, 282 (1910)
(concluding that federal courts have "no authority" to abdicate jurisdiction because of a pending
state proceeding); Willcox v. Consol. Gas Co., 212 U.S. 19, 40 (1909) ("When a Federal court is
properly appealed to in a case over which it has by law jurisdiction, it is its duty to take such
jurisdiction .... The right of a party plaintiff to choose a Federal court where there is a choice
cannot be properly denied." (citation omitted)); Chicot County v. Sherwood, 148 U.S. 529, 534
(1893) ("[The courts of the United States are bound to proceed to judgment and to afford
redress to suitors before them in every case to which their jurisdiction extends. They cannot
abdicate their authority or duty in any case in favor of another jurisdiction.").
320. Cohens, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) at 404 (emphasis added). Chief Justice Marshall explained
why courts should not shirk their duty to exercise jurisdiction:
It is most true that this Court will not take jurisdiction if it should not. [sic] but it is
equally true, that it must take jurisdiction if it should. The judiciary cannot, as the
legislature may, avoid a measure because it approaches the confines of the constitution.
We cannot pass it by because it is doubtful. With whatever doubts, with whatever diffi-
culties, a case may be attended, we must decide it, if it be brought before us .... Ques-
tions may occur which we would gladly avoid, but we cannot avoid them. All we can do
is, to exercise our best judgment, and conscientiously to perform our duty.
Id. Justice Marshall's comments have found resonance with the Court. For example, see Justice
Brennan's warning in Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Co. where he
stated "that the federal courts have a 'virtually unflagging obligation ... to exercise the jurisdic-
tion given them."' 460 U.S. 1, 15 (1983) (alteration in original) (quoting Colo. River Water
Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976)). This belief has been expressed in
leading scholarly publications. See, e.g., Redish, supra note 317, at 112 ("[V]esting a power in
the federal courts to adjudicate the relevant claims without a corresponding duty to do so is
unacceptable."); see also Michael M. Wilson, Comment, Federal Court Stays and Dismissals in
Deference to Parallel State Court Proceedings: The Impact of Colorado River, 44 U. CHI. L. REV.
641, 641-42 (1977) (observing that the right to a federal forum is secured by the Constitution);
Note, Power to Stay Federal Proceedings Pending Termination of Concurrent State Litigation, 59
YALE L.J. 978, 980 (1950) (same); Note, Stays of Federal Proceedings in Deference to Concur-
rently Pending State Court Suits, 60 COLUM. L. REV. 684, 687 (1960) (the right to a federal forum
is secured by the Constitution and supportive judicial precedent). See generally Barry Friedman,
A Revisionist Theory of Abstention, 88 MICH. L. REV. 530 (1989); Linda S. Mullenix, A Branch
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the exercise of any form of abstention to be an act of "treason." In-
stead, under the guise of preserving federalism, abstention has be-
come a means of reducing the burden of crowded federal dockets.
The question is just how far federal courts will stray from their proper
role to lighten their loads.
Where a parallel state court proceeding is involved, considerations
of abstention are valid. However, where the parallel state court action
is properly removed to federal court without procedural defect or ob-
jection under diversity jurisdiction, as in Huth, the remand of the state
court action to create a parallel state court action to support absten-
tion creates a precedent in which defendants are foreclosed from liti-
gating jurisdictionally appropriate cases in federal court. To
accomplish this procedural maneuver, the federal court is in essence
creating the parallel state court proceeding.
The Supreme Court has recognized that a decision to abstain from
exercising jurisdiction must rest "on a careful balancing of the impor-
tant factors as they apply in a given case, with the balance heavily
weighted in favor of the exercise of jurisdiction. '321 It seems that
there is no longer a requirement to exercise their "virtually unflagging
obligation" to accept jurisdiction. Instead, the federal courts have
been given license to avoid jurisdiction through procedural maneuver-
ing. With federal courts as willing partners, plaintiffs' counsel can ma-
nipulate the need for federal abstention at the expense of federalism
and the separation of powers.
The diminished role played by parallel state proceedings in the
overall abstention analysis is the most significant change. The trend is
to view the presence or absence of a pending parallel state action as
only one factor in the overall abstention analysis. This viewpoint has
made it significantly easier for the federal courts to employ the ab-
stention doctrine to remand a properly removed state action to create
a parallel state court proceeding postremoval.
The emerging trend has taken place in the context of cases involv-
ing the FDJA and state declaratory judgment actions. However, the
underlying reasoning in these cases may have broader implications if
the trend develops further. Notwithstanding a proper removal to fed-
eral court which is not procedurally challenged, courts employing the
emerging abstention trend can, at their discretion, view the removed
action as a "pending" state action factored into the analysis, or the
Too Far, Pruning the Abstention Doctrine, 75 GEo. L.J. 99 (1986); David L. Shapiro, Jurisdiction
and Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543 (1985).
321. Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp., 460 U.S. at 16. Stated differently, a district court's task "is
not to find some substantial reason for the exercise of federal jurisdiction." Id. at 25.
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courts can consider the absence of a pending state action postremoval
as one of many factors in the overall analysis of whether abstention
should be applied. This reasoning may open the door for a court to
exercise absolute discretion in favor of remand of a removed, proce-
durally correct, state court action under abstention principles.
The Huth decision has significantly expanded the abstention doc-
trine in a manner contrary to the limiting principle expressed in Colo-
rado River, by extending the Brillhart reasoning to declaratory
judgment actions in which there is no pending parallel state action.
This expansion of the abstention doctrine is predicated upon a prover-
bial puzzle: "Which came first, the chicken or the egg?" The district
court in Huth explained its decision to apply the abstention doctrine in
a footnote:
[T]here is no state court action as it has been removed to federal
court. The Court does not find this argument persuasive. Clearly
[the original state action] began in state court. Once this court de-
cides to remand the action the case will proceed in state court rather
than federal court. Hartford can not avoid the Court's jurisdictional
discretion under the FDJA by removing a state court action and
then arguing no state court action exists. 322
The irony in this argument is that the logical fallacy of which the
district court accused Hartford is exactly the reasoning the district
court employed to remand the original state action. The district court
remanded the original state action based upon Brillhart discretion that
exists only where there is a pending parallel state court action. Ac-
cordingly, the court first had to remand in order to gain the discretion
that is exercised when remanding the case. To use the court's reason-
ing, the court could not exercise its discretion under the FDJA by re-
manding a case and then arguing that a pending parallel state action
existed which gives it the right to exercise such discretion. Devaluing
a pending parallel state proceeding may also have an effect on re-
moval actions involving federal questions. One of the central factors
that allowed the federal court to maintain jurisdiction in Sherwin-Wil-
liams was the lack of a pending parallel state court action. The court
in Sherwin-Williams observed that "[t]he presence of federal law is-
sues is especially important when there is no pending state court pro-
ceeding to which the federal district court can defer. ' 323 However,
Sherwin-Williams did not involve a removed state action. Using the
procedural maneuvering employed in the Huth decision in a removal
322. Hartford Ins. Co. of the Midwest v. Huth, No. Civ. 00-2067-PHX-MHM, No. Civ. 00-
2345-PHX-MHM, slip op. at 5 n.4 (D. Ariz. Apr. 5, 2001).
323. Sherwin-Williams Co. v. Holmes County, 343 F.3d 383, 396 (5th Cir. 2003).
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situation, the federal court may have a state court proceeding to which
it can defer. As in Huth, the court may view the removed action as a
parallel state action due to its state origins. Thus, the devaluation of
the presence of a pending parallel state proceeding may also devalue
the presence of federal issues. The net effect is that all removed ac-
tions may now provide federal courts with the opportunity to defer to
the state court through abstention.
IV. CONCLUSION
This Article discussed strategies for defeating removal that were ex-
clusive to procedural manipulations. It has always been the preroga-
tive of the federal courts to strictly enforce procedural rules that are
inescapably maneuverable. However, the most recent strategy for de-
feating removal involves the neutralization of the federal removal pro-
cess itself. This can be accomplished through manipulation of the
concept of a parallel state court proceeding and its significance to the
judicial exercise of jurisdictional discretion.
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